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NOTES
THE UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT
ACT: FACILITATION OF OR IMPEDIMENT
TO REFORM FAVORABLE TO THE TENANT?
Three clearly articulated purposes for the Uniform Residential
Landlord and Tenant Act (URLTA) promulgated by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws are "to simplify
clarify, modernize, and revise the law governing the rental of dwelling
units and the rights and obligations of landlords and tenants; ... to
encourage landlords and tenants to maintain and improve the quality
of housing; and .. . to make uniform the law with respect to the sub-
ject of this Act among those states which enact it."' The version of the
Act to be discussed in this Note is the "Approved Draft," dated January
31, 1973.2 Although adoption of this draft with only minor variations
in two jurisdictions3 may presage a trend of state action to revitalize the
law of residential leases, it has been suggested that enactment of com-
prehensive legislation in this area will encounter opposition from groups
representing tenants' interests because "additional reforms will be
achieved by court decisions, and ... such reforms would be far more
extensive than those proposed to be included in this Act" 4 From the
1. Uwwonj[ REsEaNr1L LANDLORD AND TmANr Acr § 1.102 (b) [hereinafter cited
as URLTA].
2. The "Approved Draft," the fourth draft of the Act, was submitted to the Ameri-
can Bar Association for its consideration. Subcommittee on Model Landlord-Tenant
Act of Committee on Leases, Proposed Uniform Residential Landlord-Tenant Act, 8
REAL PRoP., PRoB. & TR. J. 104 n.4 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Subcommitteel. It sub-
sequently was withdrawn, however, in the face of certain reservations and objections,
relating primarily to imprecise draftsmanship. Id. at 123-24. Following joint review of
these reservations and objections, the Subcommittee and the Commissioner agreed
upon changes to be incorporated into the Act, which, as thus amended, was approved
by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association. PNoBaTE AD PRoPERTY,
Spring 1974, at 7. This latest version of the Act was not available to the authors at
the time this Note was written.
3. Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-1301 to -1381 (1973); Ore. Laws of 1973, ch. 559
(Strum, The Landlord-Tenant Relationship: 1980 and Beyond, 9 REAL PRoP., PROB. & TR.
J. 24 n.56 (1974). The Act is also the basis of the Virginia Residential Landlord and
Tenant Act. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-248.2 to -248.40 (Supp. 1974).
4. Subcommittee, supra note 2, at 123. This report continues:
They [tenants' interest groups] fear that this Act, if endorsed by the Ameri-
can Bar Association, would exist as a set of standards and guidelines for
judges involved in these decisions, even if the Act were not passed by the
specific jurisdiction. The result would be that the standards themselves
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tenants' point of view, the URLTA thus might be seen as posing a
barrier to more sweeping judicial reforms in landlord-tenant law.
Gauging the likely effect of the URLTA on alternative routes of
reform in favor of the tenant requires an examination of the judicial
developments the Act may supercede, an analysis of the worth of the
provisions of the URLTA itself, and an honest evaluation of the re-
liance that should be placed on the continued expansion of relief for
tenants from other sources such as the courts and the legislatures. In
addition, this Note will inquire into the extent that ongoing judicial ac-
tivism was intended by the draftsmen of the URLTA or, at least, is
permitted by the Act. For the purposes of specific comparisons, certain
provisions of the Model Residential Landlord-Tenant Code5 also will be
examined.
JUDICIAL REFORM OF LANDLORD-TENANT LAW
Probably in no other area of landlord-tenant law has there been so
clear a trend of judicial decisions favoring tenants as in the law govern-
ing landlord obligations to deliver and maintain premises which are
suitable for human habitation. To grasp the nature of reform in this
area and to understand the policy underlying such reform, the common
law rules in effect prior to the recent developments must be reviewed.
Common Law Rules and Exceptions
Three basic rules governing landlord-tenant law developed as the
result of the early common law view of the lease as a conveyance of
an interest in real property.6 The first of these was the doctrine of
caveat emptor, absolving the landlord of any obligation to deliver
premises suitable for the tenant's intended use. Delivery of unfit premises
was neither a defense to an action for ren nor grounds for recovery
would be relied upon by judges searching for appropriate guidelines.
These standards would therefore become the limit beyond which any
suggested reform would be condemned as unreasonable, if not radical.
Id.
5. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, MODEL REsIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE (Tent.
Draft 1969) [hereinafter cited as MODEL CODE].
6. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.11 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited
as Casner].
7. Id. § 3.45. "There is no implied covenant or warranty that at the time the term
commences the premises are in a tenantable condition or that they are adapted to the
purpose for which leased." Id. at 267 (footnotes omitted),
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in tort for personal injury or property damages.8 A prospective tenant
neglected to inspect the premises before execution of the lease at his
peril; he was protected only if he obtained an express warranty of fitness
from his lessorY A second early common law rule, logically related to
the caveat emptor principle, was that the landlord, absent an express
undertaldng, owed no duty to maintain the premises or make repairs
during the lease term;' rather, it was the tenant who was obliged to
maintain the premises during his tenancy as an outgrowth of his duty
not to commit waste."I
The final early rule, that the covenants in a lease were mutually in-
dependent unless expressly made dependent, was founded upon the
concept of a lease as a conveyance rather than a contract. Accordingly,
breach by the landlord of any covenants given expressly or impliedly
neither discharged nor suspended the duty of the tenant to perform
under his covenants. Although the tenant ultimately could recover
damages, he had to continue rental payments to the landlord, even dur-
ing the pendency of legal proceedings, and he could not rely upon the
landlord's breach as a basis for either abatement of rent or rescission. 3
The development of these rules was related to the fact that most
leases originally involved the conveyance of land. In an agrarian econ-
omy, any structures on the land ordinarily were deemed incidental to
the primary purpose of the lease because land, not buildings, produced
the anticipated rent.14 Application of the general rules, however, oc-
casionally yielded unacceptably harsh results, and development of
exceptions became necessary."'
Constructive eviction, an exception first enunciated in Dyett v. Pen-
dletoni' in 1826, concerned the landlord's covenant of quiet enjoyment
implied in all leases to allow the tenant undisturbed use of the demised
8. Id. 5 3.45.
9. Id.
10. Id. § 3.78. "The lessor is under no obligation to the tenant to make repairs to
the property in the absence of a covenant or a statute imposing such a duty." id. at
346 (footnote omitted).
11. Id. at 347.
12. Id. §3.11.
13. Clearly, the tenant could not, at early common law, force the landlord to com-
ply by means of injunctive relief or specific performance, where the tenant had not
performed his covenants.
14. Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791,793 (Iowa 1972).
15. These exceptions later provided precedent for a complete abandonment of the
general rules. See, e.g., Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 NE.2d 831, 838
(Mass. 1973).
16. 8 Cow. 727 (N.Y. 1826).
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premises. A constructive eviction occurred when the landlord's failure to
protect the tenant in his quiet enjoyment of the leasehold caused the ten-
ant to be forced off the premises. Such involuntary removal was deemed
equivalent to eviction by physical ouster and afforded the tenant the same
remedies available upon actual eviction." Before a tenant could be ex-
cused from his obligations under the lease, however, it was necessary
that he demonstrate'8 that he had abandoned the premises within a
reasonable time 9 because of a substantial interference with enjoyment or
possession. In abandoning the premises, the tenant acted at his peril. 0
If he miscalculated either the severity of the interference with his en-
joyment of the premises or the reasonableness of time elapsed between
interference and abandonment, his obligation to pay rent continued,
notwithstanding that he was no longer on the premises. In addition to
the risk assumed by the tenant that he subsequently would be unable
to establish the elements of a constructive eviction, the hardship in-
volved in vacating generally militated against this course of action
except in the most extreme circumstances.
Two other exceptions to the general common law rules were de-
veloped to provide redress when application of those rules produced
results which did not comport with their underlying policy. The first
involved implication in a short term lease of a furnished dwelling of a
warranty that the dwelling was fit for habitation. Due to the short
term of the lease, the parties were assumed to have intended immediate
occupancy; accordingly, the tenant was deemed not to have had full
opportunity for reasonable inspection of the premises before execut-
ing the lease.2' The other exception arose when a lease was executed
while the building demised was still under construction, the justifica-
tion again being chiefly the lack of sufficient opportunity to inspect.22
Present Trends of Common Law Reform
Although the rules derived from the common law concept of the
lease as a conveyance of land were appropriate to the agrarian economy
in which they developed, they "increasingly lost viability in the era of
17. 1 Casner, supra note 6, § 3.51, at 279-80.
18. Id. at 282.
19. If abandonment was not within a reasonable time, the tenant was held to have
waived the defect. Id.
20. For a discussion of this "risk" to the tenant, see Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii
426, -, 462 P.2d 470, 475 (1969).
21. 1 Casner, supra note 6, § 3.45, at 267.
22. Id. at 268.
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industrialization with its attendant exploding urban population and
housing."23 Consequently, courts have begun to reject some or all of
the old law in order to meet the needs and expectations of the con-
temporary urban tenant;24 traditional doctrines have been abandoned
by several courts as having "outlived their usefulness." 25 Moreover, the
impact of the old common law rules has been reduced by sporadic
statutory reform. 6 Even in the many jurisdictions retaining the old
rules, 27 courts generally have indicated a responsiveness to the problems
of the urban tenant, especially the indigent with limited housing al-
ternatives.
These indicia of judicial concern for the plight of the tenant form
the basis for the argument that tenant interests will be better served by
evolving case law than by a statutory codification of obligations and
remedies. Closer examination of the nature and scope of the tenant's
predicament, however, indicates that case law developments thus far
have only just begun to effectuate the policy that underlies the trend
towards affording relief to the tenant.
Policy Considerations
A fundamental policy consideration underlying judicial and legisla-
tive reshaping of landlord-tenant law is the difference in the expecta-
tions of the modem urban tenant and the eighteenth century agrarian
tenant. 8 Early common law assumed that the primary interest -of the
tenant was the land itself, rather than any dwelling or structure there-
on, and that the tenant had the ability to repair the relatively simple
structures conveyed incidental to the lease of land. The residential
tenant's ability to correct defects, however, has declined as the con-
struction of dwellings has become more complex. Moreover, the in-
creased mobility of the modem tenant, with his resultant lack of in-
23. Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 793 (Iowa 1972).
24. These changes are not wholly revolutionary, as earlier cases seem to have fore-
shadowed the newer rules to some extent. See Medico-Dental Bldg. Co. v. Horton &
Converse, 21 Cal. 2d 411, 132 P.2d 457 (1942) (regarding the independent covenants
rule); Delamnater v. Foreman, 184 Minn. 428, 239 N.W. 148 (1931) (regarding a war-
ranty of habitability).
25. Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 841 (Mam. 1973);
see, e.g, Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973).
26. See notes 81-84 infra & accompanying text.
27. This seems to be the result of the doctrine of stare decisis and a judicial desire
to refrain from usurpation of the legislative function. See notes 415-17 infra & ac-
companying text.
28. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1077-78 (D.C. C:r. 1970).
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rerest in maintaining someone else's property, further invalidates the
assumptions upon which the old common law rules rested.0
Suggestions have been made that landlord-tenant law adopt the "con-
sumer protection" principles operative in other areas of the law.3 Cases
involving the sale of chattels,31 negotiable instruments,32 and especially
the sale of real property, 33 often are cited to illustrate the tendency of
modem courts to disregard established legal doctrines in order to pro-
tect the consumer who has little opportunity to obtain adequate pro-
tection through the normal bargaining process.3 4
Today, the prospective tenant is in a poor position from which to
bargain for desired conditions of habitation. Recent housing shortages,
especially for low- and moderate-income tenants, have enabled landlords
to select tenants who will accept lease provisions which are often as fa-
vorable to the owners as were the early common law rules.35 Thus, the
nature of the housing market itself provides an additional reason for re-
forming landlord-tenant law.
Manifest legislative intent to modernize landlord-tenant law also
has induced courts to alter the old rules.36 Such an intent was found
29. Id. at 1078.
30. Id. at 1079.
31. E.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
32. Unico v. Owen, 50 NJ. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).
33. Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964); Gable v. Silver, 258
So. 2d 11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc, 44 N.J. 70, 207
A.2d 314 (1965); Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
34. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'1 Realty Corp, 428 F.2d 1071, 1075-76 (D.C. Cir.
1970). The analogy to consumer protection cases in the context of urban residential
leases has been criticized. Comment, Landlord-Tenant-Landlord's Violation of Hous-
ing Code During Lease Term is Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability Constituting
Partial or Total Defense to an Eviction Action Based on Non-Payment of Rent, 84
HARv. L. REv. 729, 732-33 (1971). It is argued that the lease of rental housing is dis-
tinguishable from the sale of goods in that there is no substitute product available if
the application of consumer protection requirements results in a reduced supply of
housing. Use of tenant remedies to improve housing standards may in fact be counter-
productive by forcing a necessity off the market. While the consumer protection rules
in the chattel sales area also may force goods off the market, there are usually such
counterbalancing factors as the availability of substitute goods and increased product
safety which will compensate for this result. Id. at 733. This argument raises complex
questions of the appropriateness of tenant remedies as a means of improving housing
standards, questions which can be answered satisfactorily only by an extensive compi-
lation of empirical data. See note 39 infra.
35. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp, 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
36. See, e.g., Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 796 (Iowa 1972); Kline v. Burns, 111
N.H. 87, - , 276 A.2d 248, 251 (1971); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, -, 111 N.W.2d
409, 412-13 (1961).
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initially in the enactment of state and local housing codes, which were
seen as an expression of a legislative desire to ensure minimum housing
standards for all citizens . 7 More recently, this intent has been drawn
from statutes which either impose particular obligations on landlords
to maintain leased property or provide specific remedies for tenants
whose landlords fail to maintain the premises according to the statu-
tory standardY8 Although a legislative mandate may be a reliable in-
dicator of public policy, it raises questions concerning whether such
legislation is intended to provide exclusive remedies foreclosing judicial
expansion of others. 9
The size and complexity of the modem multifamily residence militate
against the practicability of the old common law concepts, especially
37. Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, -, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412 (1961).
38. Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 NE.2d 831, 840-41 (Mass. 1973).
39. See notes 415-17 infra & accompanying text. The possibility that the remedies
are intended to be exclusive raises the broader question of the desirability of tenant
remedies as a means of housing code enforcement and as a tool to improve housing
standards generally. Reliance upon tenants for housing code enforcement is necessary
because of the lack of effectiveness that has typified the normal modes of housing code
enforcement. Nevertheless, the anticipated success of tenant enforcement raises the
specter of urban landlords abandoning their property rather than complying with
strict and burdensome standards of habitability. A concomitant effect would be a slow-
ing of the flow of new investment capital into this type of property, thereby reducing
the already inadequate supply of rental housing. See Daniels, judicial and Legislative
Remedies for Substandard Housing: Landlord-Tenant Law Reform in the District of
Columbia, 59 Gro. L.J. 909 (1971). See also Note, Current Interest Areas of Landlord-
Tenant Law in Iowa, 22 DRAKE L. Rv. 376, 383 (1973) (hereinafter cited as Current
Interest]; Comment, Tenant Protection in lowa-Mease v. Fox and the Implied War-
ranty of Habitability, 58 IowA L. REv. 656 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Tenant Protec-
tion]; Note, The Model Residential Landlord-Tenant Code, 26 RuTGERs L. Rav. 647,
655 (1973). See also note 34 supra. In NAToINAL CoMsISSON ON URBAN PROBLEMS,
BUILDING Hnm AmERicAN Crrv 286 (1969) [hereinafter cited as NATiONAL CoMMIssIoN],
it is stated: "Commission studies on this point have led to the conclusion . . . that
strict enforcement on a mass basis would lead to mass abandonment of properties by
their owners and/or higher rents with resultant occupant displacement. . . . Thus, it
is essential that there be an abundance of housing for the low-income population in
order to enhance the feasability of strict housing code enforement."
In Daniels, supra, at 913-20, the normal methods of housing code enforcement, their
inadequacy, and the resort to tenant remedies are discussed. Some courts have shown
an appreciation for the dilemma of strict housing code enforcement, e.g., Diamond
Housing Corp. v. Robinson, 257 A.2d 492, 495 (D.C. Cr. App. 1969), while others
have refused to wield their authority in enforcement of housing codes, e.g., Posnanski
v. Hood, 46 Wis. 2d 172, 174 N.W.2d 528 (1970). Care must be taken to distinguish
between the use of tenant remedies as a means of housing code enforcement and the
closely related question of the use of housing codes as a standard of habitability in the
enforcement of tenant remedies. The former issue is tangential to the present inquiry
while the latter is directly pertinent. See notes 89-111 infra & accompanying text for
a discussion of the latter issue.
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the doctrine of caveat emptor. Due to the character of such structures,
the landlord is in a far better position than the tenant to know of most
defects, especially since he, not the tenant, will be notified by the public
authorities if the defect constitutes a violation of a local housing
code. 40 Furthermore, the tenant cannot reasonably be expected to know
of defects or to make repairs, for example, to heating and plumbing
systems located in a part of the building into which he has no access.
In reforming the law governing the obligations of the landlord to
maintain fit premises, the courts have intended to confer upon the
tenant ordinary contractual rights not afforded under classic real prop-
erty law.4 New rules are applied in recognition of "the fact that a lease
is, in essence, a sale as well' as a transfer of an estate in land and is,
more importantly, a contractual relationship." 42 This premise, articu-
lated in many of the recent decisions, is the basis of an implied obliga-
tion of the landlord to provide a habitable dwelling at the inception
of the lease and to maintain it as such continuously throughout the
duration of the lease term. By conceptualizing the lease as a contract,
the tenant's obligation to pay rent is made dependent upon the land-
lord's fulfillment of his maintenance obligation.
Despite the wide legislative and judicial recognition of the numerous
policy justifications for altering the older law, no clear rule of law has
been established fixing landlord and tenant rights and dudes vis-a-vis
habitability. In fact, reliance upon policy considerations by various
courts has yielded divergent results. This divergence itself may indi-
cate that only a comprehensive statute can integrate the presently frag-
mented law into a coherent whole.43
Habitability of Premises: Implied Warranty and
Illegal Contract Theories
The first modem approach 4 to the habitability question was taken
by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Pines v. Perssion,4 ; in which college
40. See, e.g., Kline v. Burns, ill N.H. 87, -, 276 A.2d 248, 251 (1971).
41. See Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 795 (Iowa 1972).
42. Id., quoting Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, -, 462 P.2d 470, 474 (1969). See
generally Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingwvay, 293 NJ.E2d 831, 838 (Mass. 1973),
where the lease is conceptualized as "essentially a contract in which the landlord
promised to deliver premises suitable to the tenant's purpose in return for the tenant's
promise to pay rent."
43. See notes 396-414 infra & accompanying text.
44. See note 24 supra for cases that possibly were "ahead of the times" in this re-
gard.
45. 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
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student tenants sought to recover a deposit paid to their landlord for
the rental of a furnished house for the nine-month school year. Fol-
lowing several days of occupancy, they had abandoned the house after
first attempting to correct its defects themselves and after the local
housing department inspector confirmed the existence of several hous-
ing code violations. In a rather brief opinion, the court found an implied
warranty of habitability 6 and permitted the tenants to recover the
rental deposit, less the portion allocable to the time they had remained
in possession, as well as the expenses incurred in the effort to remedy
the defects 7
In holding that the warranty of habitability and the tenants' cove-
nant to pay rent were mutually dependent, the court stated: "To follow
the old rule of no implied warranty of habitability in leases would, in our
opinion, be inconsistent with the current legislative policy concerning
housing standards. The need and social desirability of adequate housing
for people in this era of rapid population increases is too important to
be rebuffed by that obnoxious legal cliche, caveat emptor."48
Although this broad statement of the rule of implied warranty is the
leading precedent for similar rulings in other courts,49 two factors are
relevant to place Pines in its proper perspective. First, the facts in Pines
could have supported a decision based upon the established common law
exception permitting an implied warranty in the case of a short-term
lease of a furnished dwelling. The court in Pines discussed this exception
to the general rule against such warranties but, indicating that it was an
exception "to be extended rather than restricted,"6 0 proceeded to base
its holding upon a new, broader rule.6'
Second, in Wisconsin the broad Pines statement of the doctrine
of implied warranty seems to have been emasculated, if not aban-
doned. In Posnanski v. Hood 2 a tenant defended against his landlord's
action for rent with the argument that his obligation to pay was elim-
inated because the leased premises had several housing code violations
46. Id. at - , 111 N.W.2d at 412.
47. Although the court did not discuss the issue in detail, this latter allowance can
be seen as a forerunner for another type of tenant remedy, "repair and deduct," which
has been allowed both judicially and by statute in various jurisdictions. Id. at -, 111
N.W.2d at 413.
48. Id. at-, III NAV.2d at 412-13.
49. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Mease v. Fox, 200 N.V.2d 791, 794 (Iowa 1972).
50. 14 WVis. 2d at -, 111 N.W.2d 412.
51. Accord, Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969).
52. 46 Wis. 2d 172, 174 N.W.2d 528 (1970).
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rendering the lease an illegal contract, therefore unenforceable and
void. 3 Other cases adhering to the illegal contract theory were dis-
tinguished by the court with the observation that they concerned hous-
ing code violations which existed at the start of the lease term while
the present defects developed after the effective date of the lease. Ruling
against the tenant, the court held that it would not sanction rent with-
holding as a means of housing code enforcement without specific
legislative authorization.54
Perhaps the failure of the tenant to raise the issue of implied warranty
as espoused in Pines explains the absence of any discussion of this theory
in Hood; in any event, the present status of the law in XWisconsin must
be considered unclear.55 Fortunately for tenants, the restriction of the
implied warranty doctrine in the parent jurisdiction has not been car-
ried over into other states which have followed PihesY' Hood serves to
point out a weakness of court-made doctrine, however: it is more sus-
ceptible to subsequent judicial limitation than is a well-articulated
statutory rule.57
The list of other jurisdictions which have, to some extent, followed
Pines is expanding rapidly 8 Pines established the implied warranty
theory as a means by which the tenant may, in effect, rescind a lease
for a breach of the warranty of habitability. Rescission has been per-
mitted in a number of other jurisdictions on the basis of either a narrow
holding or dicta when the court was presented with a variant fact situa-
53. The tenant relied upon Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Ct.
App. 1968), in which a tenant employed the illegal contract theory to defeat an ac-
tion by a landlord for possession premised upon nonpayment of rent.
54. 46 Wis. 2d at - , 174 N.W.2d at 531-33.
55. See notes 396-99 infra & accompanying text.
56. E.g., Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); King v. Moorehead, 495
S.W.2d 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973). In these cases the courts relied upon the implied
warranty theory under facts similar to those in Hood.
57. See notes 396-98 infra & accompanying text.
58. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Green v.
Sumski, 42 U.S.L.W. 2397 (Cal. Jan. 15, 1974); Quesenbury v. Patrick, 2 CCH Pov. L.
REP. t 15,803 (El Paso County Cr, Colo., 1972); Givens v. Gray, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP.
15,412 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969);
Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Mease v. Fox, 200
N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 NE.2d 831
(Mass. 1973); Rome v. Walker, 38 Mich. App. 458, 196 N.W.2d 850 (1972); King v.
Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Kline v. Burns, ill N.H. 87, 276 A.2d
248 (1971); Berzito v. Gambino, 63 NJ. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973); Morbeth Realty
Corp. v. Velez, 73 Misc. 2d 996, 343 N.Y.S.2d 406 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1973);
Glyco v. Schultz, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 16,608 (Sylvania Mun. Ct., Ohio, 1972); Foisy
v. Wyman, 515 P.2d 160 (Wash. 1973).
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tion."' In other cases in which the tenant desired to stay in possession,
the implied warranty doctrine has been invoked to allow him to deduct
his cost of repairs from his rental obligation ° or to justify abatement of
rent based on the decreased value of premises in defective condition.'1
Abatement often has taken the form of an order permitting the tenant
to withhold rent,62 the amount withheld usually being paid into court.63
Courts also have awarded damages to tenants for breach of the warranty
of habitability.6 4
Avoidance of rent obligations premised upon the separate doctrine
f illegal contract was enunciated first by the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit in Brown v. Southall Realty Company,6 6
which involved a lease of premises by a landlord who knew there were
several housing code violations thereon. Applying a provision of the
District of Columbia housing regulations which prohibited the leasing of
any habitation not in a "clean, safe, and sanitary condition, in repair,
and free from rodents or vermin," the court held that the lease was
entered into in violation of the regulations and was therefore void and
unenforceable;66 consequently, the tenant was freed of any obligation
to pay rent under the illegal lease. A later decision, Diamond Housing
Corp. v. Robinson,6r clarified the Brown rule by holding that the tenant
could avoid his obligation to pay rent even where the landlord had no
official notice of such violations, provided that the violations existed at
59. E.g., Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Boston Housing
Authority v. Hemingway, 293 NE.2d 831 (Mass. 1973); Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper,
53 NJ. 414, 251 A.2d 268 (1969).
60. Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970). In effect, this type of recov-
ery also was allowed in Pines, since the tenants were permitted to recover the expenses
that they had incurred in their initial efforts to repair the premises.
61. E.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Hinson
v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1972); Meuse v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791
(Iowa 1972); Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831 (Mass. 1973);
King v. Moorehead, 495 S.V.2d 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J.
460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973).
62. E.g., King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Academy Spires,
Inc. v. Brown, 111 NJ. Super. 577, 268 A.2d 556 (Dist. Ct. 1970).
63. King. v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
64. Berzito v. Gambino, 63 NJ. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973). This remedy results par-
tially from construing the lease as a contract but primarily from the doctrine of im-
plied warranty, since at early common law the tenant could maintain a separate action
for breach of promise in the lease by the landlord; it was the lack of such a promise
that created the tenant's problem.
65. 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968).
66. Id. at 836-37.
67. 257 A.2d 492 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969).
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the commencement of the lease-term.68 Although the tenant in Diamond
Housing had entered the premises under an illegal lease, he was held
not to have been a trespasser but a tenant at sufferance entitled to re-
main in possession until given proper notice to quit by the landlord.,"
Certain limitations inherent in the illegal contract doctrine may ac-
count for its secondary importance relative to the implied warranty of
habitability doctrine. Technically, the illegal contract doctrine is appli-
cable only if the defects in question were present and kmown to the
landlord at the inception of the lease.70 It does not create in the land-
lord a continuing duty to repair, as does the accepted version of the im-
plied warranty doctrine.71 In a very technical analysis, one court has
refused to apply the illegal contract theory, stating that, although the
landlord's leasing of the premises in violation of the local housing code
was illegal, the tenant himself was equally guilty of illegal conduct in
executing the lease and occupying the premises. 72
A second reason for the failure of the doctrine to gain acceptance is
that, as with the discarded constructive eviction theory, the tenant
eventually must leave the premises if he claims that the lease is void
and unenforceable. If the landlord can be prevented from holding the
tenant to rental obligations under the voided lease, it would be incon-
sistent to allow the tenant to remain on the premises under that same
lease. One court summarized the situation as follows: "In the present
case the tenant does not wish to terminate the lease, but desires to re-
main in possession of the premises, with the housing code violations re-
paired. Thus the application of the principle of illegal contract, even
if applicable, would be of no help to this tenant. 73
Another problem associated with the illegal contract theory concerns
68. Id. at 494 (dictum). The court found that the landlord had actual notice of the
violations. Id.
69. Id. at 495.
70. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
71. In Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 796 (Iowa 1972), for example, the implied
warranty is described as a promise that "at the outset of the lease ...there are no
latent defects in facilities and utilities vital to the use of the premises for residential
purposes and that these essential features shall remain during the entire term in such
condition to maintain the habitability of the dwelling."
72. Golden v. Gray, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP,. 15,295 (N.Y. Sup. Ct, Monroe County,
1971).
73. Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 68, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661, 664 (1972) (rejecting
the illegal contract doctrine in favor of the doctrine of implied warranty of habitability).
Although the tenant becomes a tenant at sufferance under the illegal contract doctrine, it
has been said that the landlord is under a duty to terminate such an illegal tenancy.
Diamond Housing Corp. v. Robinson, 257 A.2d 492, 495 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969).
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the tenant's obligation for rent for the period of occupancy. Brown
indicated that there would be no such liability, but the question was
not fully discussed. In the only reported decision that clearly faces the
issue, King v,. Aloorehead,74 a Missouri court held that the landlord
is entitled, for the period the tenant remains in possession,7" to the reason-
able rental value of the premises in their defective condition.7 6
King also raises the issue of the necessity for electing between the
illegal contract theory and the implied warranty theory when the
tenant attempts to plead both. They clearly are inconsistent, since the
illegal contract theory denies the existence of a valid lease while the
implied warranty theory not only recognizes its validity but inserts an
additional term, creating a right of recovery under the added provi-
sion.7 7  The monetary results under either theory probably will
be identical, at least where the landlord is allowed to recover the rea-
sonable rental value of the premises while the tenant was in possession;78
nevertheless, because the implied warranty theory allows the tenant to re-
main in possession for the balance of the lease term, it would seem to be
preferable for tenants, especially where substitute housing is not readily
available.7
Consonant with the judicially developed implied warranty and il-
legal contract theories,80 some state legislation has abrogated the com-
74. 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
75. Id. at 78-79. This case also expanded the original statement of the illegal contract
theory in Brown by holding that the housing code violation need not be a "knowing
violation at the time of letting," thereby indicating that any violation at any time dur-
ing the tenancy would render the lease void. Id. at 78.
76. Id. at 79.
77. id.
78. If the implied warranty doctrine is invoked to allow the tenant an abatement in
rent while he was in possession of the premises, the amount of such abatement will
be measured by the difference between the value of the premises as warranted and
their actual value in the defective condition. The tenant in effect would pay rent equal
to the reasonable value of the premises in their defective state, which is presumably the
amount that the tenant also would owe under the King version of the illegal contract
doctrine.
79. A hybrid of the two theories apparently was utilized in Posnanski v. Department
of Agric., 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 17,054 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Dane County, 1973), in which
the court upheld a state administrative agency cease and desist order preventing a
landlord from leasing premises which had been cited by municipal authorities for hous-
ing code violations. Although the unfair trade practice alleged was misrepresentation
premised upon advertising the premises for rent without full disclosure, the court re-
lied upon the implied warranty doctrine in upholding the order which itself sought
to prevent the formation of illegal contracts.
80. In addition to the implied warranty and illegal contract theories, there is a third
which apparently has not received a great deal of attention in the courts as a means
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mon law rule against the implied warranty of habitability. As with the
judicial remedies, the statutory developments have been erratic, with
no manifest legislative intent to reshape entirely the landlord-tenant
relationship. Instead, the legislatures appear to have intended only spe-
cific, limited remedies to ameliorate the harshness of the common
law, possibly in response to political pressures from organized tenant
interest groups. Thus, some states have enacted statutes which allow
rent withholding,81 while others have enacted "repair and deduct"
statutes granting the tenant a right to make repairs and deduct their
cost from rental payments;82 other miscellaneous remedies, such as
rent strike-receivership, 83 have also been developed. In the District of
Columbia, the statutory effort codified previous judicial reforms.es
Because the statutory remedies are substantially identical to those
developed in comparable case law, a detailed discussion of their policy
and provisions would not be helpful. For present purposes, the signifi-
cance of the various statutes lies in their influence upon the development
of case law. Specific instances of simultaneous judicial and legislative
response to the need for alteration of the common law rules provide
perhaps the most reliable indication of the possible effects of the URLTA
on judicial reform of landlord-tenant law. 5
of protecting tenant interests. This theory is based upon express warranty and involves
an analogy to section 2-313(1) (b) of the Uniform Commercial Code. The Iowa Su-
preme Court in Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972), suggested by way of dic-
tum that a landlord's representation that he was leasing a "house," "home," or "apart-
ment" would create an express warranty by description and justify the tenant's expec-
tation that the premises would be reasonably suitable for occupancy. Id. at 796. Absent
any statutory enactment creating such a warranty or rules regarding permissible dis-
claimer, this theory does not seem to possess any advantages over the more widely
used implied warranty doctrine. These limits on the express warranty doctrine, in
addition to the fact that the implied warranty doctrine does have some precedents in
the common law exceptions to the old "no warranty" rule, are the most plausible ex-
planations for the lack of acceptance by the courts of an express warranty theory.
81. Come. GEN. STAT. ANN. 5 19-347b (1968); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 239, § 9A
(Supp. 1973); MicH. ComI'. LAWS ANN. § 125.530(3), (4) (Supp. 1973); N.J. REv. STAT.
§S 2A:42-5 et seq. (Supp. 1973); N.Y. MuLT. Dw L.. LAW § 302-a (McKinney Supp.
1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (1970).
82. CAL. Civ. CODE S 1942 (West 1954); MoNT. REv. CoDns ANN. § 42-202 (1947);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-13 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, 1 32 (1951); S.D. Comp.
LAWS AiN.n' § 43-32-9 (1967).
83. N.Y. REAL Pop. AcnoNs §§ 769-782 (McKinney Supp. 1973).
84. See Daniels, supra note 39, at 933. This article discusses attempts to incorporate
prior judicial decisions in the District of Columbia into statutory reform in the hope of
retaining the advantages of flexible judicially developed rules.
85. The judicial and statutory trend that has been discussed indicates the current
inclinations of the majority of courts which have been confronted with the habitabil-
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REFORMS UNDER THE UJRLTA
The URLTA accomplishes its reform of landlord-tenant law pri-
marily through a broad statement of landlord obligations and corres-
ponding tenant remedies. All obligations and remedies are made subject
to the Act's good faith86 and unconscionability 87 provisions which, the
official comments indicate, have been adapted from the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. Moreover, no tenant waiver of rights or remedies under
the Act will be given effect.88 Central to the landlord's obligations is
the concept of habitability, the parameters of which have troubled the
judicial reform of landlord-tenant relationships.
The Standard of Habitability Under the URLTA
Habitability is an elusive concept, both as an abstract definition and
in its application to an actual case. To reduce the uncertainty inherent
in determining habitability, a few courts have resorted to the specific
and detailed requirements of housing codes as a standard. Because of
the deficiencies in exclusive reliance upon such codes, however, the
ity issue. There have, however, been cases in which, for various reasons, courts have
refused to part completely with the older doctrines. See, e.g., cases cited in note 425
infra. See also McAuvic v. Silas, 190 Pa. Super. 24, 151 A.2d 662 (1959); Wilkinson v.
Searls, 184 S.E.2d 735 (W. Va. 1971). A tenant, therefore, cannot rely with any cer-
tainty upon a court to adopt one of the newer theories and discard the old rules.
86. URLTA § 1.302 provides: "Every duty under this Act and every act which
must be performed as a condition precedent to the exercise of a right or remedy under
this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement."
87. id. § 1.303 provides:
(a) If the court, as a matter of law, finds
(1) a rental agreement or any provision thereof was uncon-
scionable when made, the court may refuse to enforce the
agreement, enforce the remainder of the agreement without
the unconscionable provision, or limit the application of any un-
conscionable provision to avoid an unconscionable result; or
(2) a settlement in which a party waives or agrees to forego
a claim or right under this Act or under a rental agreement
was unconscionable when made, the court may refuse to
enforce the settlement, enforce the remainder of the settlement
without the unconscionable provision, or limit the application
of any unconscionable provision to avoid an unconscionable
result.
(b) If unconscionability is put into issue by a party or by the court
upon its own motion the parties shall be afforded a reasonable oppor-
tunity to present evidence as to the setting, purpose, and effect of the
rental agreement or settlement to aid the court in making the determina-
tion.
88. URLTA S 1.403 (a) (1). Section 1.403 is a general prohibition of waiver of a
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URLTA attempts to compromise code standards Nwith an element of dis-
cretion.
Some of the implied warranty of habitability cases have stated that
the housing code requires compliance or substantial compliance by the
landlord in order for his premises to be deemed habitable89 Others
have attached less significance to a housing code violation, stating that
it is only one of several factors to be considered in determining whether
the implied warranty has been breached.90 Referring to the habitability
tenant's rights and remedies, providing not only that rights of the tenant, including
fitness of premises, cannot be waived, but also, in section 1A03(b), for limited puni-
tive damages for deliberate use by a landlord of a provision known to be unenforceable
by virtue of section 1.403(a) (1).
Prohibition of waiver is a feature of the URLTA which crystallizes an otherwise
unsettled area of the case law. Several cases had stated that the tenant's right to habit-
able premises could not be waived. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071,
1081-82 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Buckner v. Azulai, 251 Cal. App. 2d 1013, -, 59 Cal. Rptr.
806, 807-08 (1967); Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 843
(Mass. 1973); cf. Cardona v. Eden Realty Co., 118 NJ. Super. 381, 288 A.2d 34 (App.
Div. 1972). Other cases, however, have indicated that there can be such a waiver.
Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 797 (Iowa 1972); Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, -, 276
A.2d 248, 252 (1971); Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, -, 308 A.2d 17, 22 (1973). The
split appears to result from a failure to distinguish between a waiver of a tenant's gen-
eral right to habitable premises and a waiver of the tenant's right to rely upon a spe-
cific defect or breach of the landlord's duty in order to enforce a tenant remedy.
Those cases holding that there can be a waiver seem to indicate that the waiver is of
a specific defect, e.g., Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 797 (Iowa 1972), while those
holding that there can be no waiver seem to be discussing the more general duties of
the landlord, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1081-82 (D.C.
Cir. 1970).
Waiver in both of these situations is eliminated under the URLTA by prohibiting
the use of a provision in a rental agreement by which the tenant "agrees to waive or
forego rights or remedies under this Act." URLTA § 1.403(a)(1). The logical in-
terpretation of this language would be that the tenant cannot be forced by the rental
agreement to waive either his "right to habitable premises" or his "remedies" under the
Act when those remedies are necessitated by a specific defect.
The Act is not clear, however, regarding whether the tenant can waive a defect by
his conduct, since section 1.403(a) (1) applies by its terms to a waiver in the rental
agreement. The comment to section 2.104 states that the landlord's "obligations" under
this section "may not be waived." Id. § 2.104, Comment. Although this statement might
support an argument that there can be no waiver, even by conduct, the comment also
refers the reader to section 1.403, indicating an apparent intent to point out the re-
lationship between sections 1.403(a)(1) and 2.104, rather than to create an additional
limitation.
89. E.g, Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Jack
Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 366, 280 N.E.2d 208, 217 (1972); Mease v. Fox,
200 N.W.2d 791, 797 (Iowa 1972).
90. E.g., Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 796-97 (Iowa 1972); Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H.
87, - , 276 A.2d 248, 252 (1971). The fact that the same case, Mease, may be cited for
both propositions serves to point out the confusion that is likely to occur from such a
URLTA
warranty, one court stated: "It is a mere matter of semantics whether
we designate this covenant one 'to repair' or 'of habitability and liva-
bility fitness.' """ Nevertheless, as has been pointed out by separate
opinions in two recent decisions, the distinction is not to be ignored.
In Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 2 the majority relied
upon a statewide sanitary code to imply a warranty of habitability in a
residential lease, stating that the code provided the threshold require-
ments for habitability and that proof of a violation would be "compel-
ling evidence that the apartment was not in habitable condition.""3 A
concurring opinion argued that the majority's holding was overly broad
and imprecise, providing no guidance as to what might constitute a
breach of the warranty; 4 instead, it asserted, the covenant should re-
quire compliance with the applicable housing regulations which were
"mandatory, detailed, precise and easily understandable minimum stand-
ards of fitness of dwelling units for human habitation." ' ; Furthermore,
the opinion asserted that the use of an ill-defined warranty of habit-
ability would result in unnecessary litigation as courts sought to es-
tablish the limits of the warranty. 0 Similarly, in Jack Spring, Inc. v.
Little,"' a dissenting opinion labeled a warranty of habitability implied
by the majority "pure and simple legal fiction,"9 " arguing that an "im-
plied covenant to repair" based upon a housing code should be utilized
instead of the broader doctrine of implied warranty of habitability, es-
pecially where the case concerns defects arising during the lease term,
rather than those present at the inception of the lease.99
Although the housing code standard lends a degree of certainty to
the habitability warranty, use of the explicit housing code standard
presents at least three problems. Initially, a defect may not be covered
misunderstanding. In Alease, the court stated that the warranty includes "a represen-
tation there neither is nor shall be during the term a violation of applicable housing
law, ordinance or regulation which shall render the premises unsafe, or unsanitary and
unfit for living therein." 200 N.W.2d at 796. Three paragraphs later the court listed
such a violation as "one . . . circumstance" to be considered in resolving the factual
question of whether there has been a breach. Id. at 796-97.
91. Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, -, 265 A.2d 526, 534 (1970).
92. 293 N.E.2d 831 (Mass. 1973).
93. Id. at 844 n.16.
94. The concurring opinion noted the majority's use of phrases such as "livable" and
"fit for human occupation." 293 NE.2d at 851.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 851-52.
97. 50 IMI. 2d 351, 280 NE.2d 208 (1972).
98. Id. at 373, 280 NZE.2d at 220.
99. Id. at 374-75, 280 NZE.2d at 221.
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by the applicable housing code, although it concerns a fundamental
item in the tenant's bargain for his lease. Enjoyment of air conditioning
or a swimming pool might be denied because of a malfunction, but a
strict housing code standard would most likely afford the tenant no
relief.100 In such a case, neither the warranty of habitability nor a
covenant to repair in accordance with the housing code would be
breached, since the absence of a swimming pool or of air conditioning
would not render a dwelling uninhabitable. Nevertheless, closer cases
might present defects which, though not actionable under a housing
code type covenant, would breach a warranty of habitability by malting
the premises unfit in which to live.'0'
A more serious difficulty with the use of a housing code standard
arises from the fact that, although housing codes are common, they
have not been adopted by all localities;102 moreover, some municipalities
are not empowered to enact them. Obviously, where there is no housing
code, one cannot be incorporated into the habitability standard; it is
equally obvious, however, that any legislature which enacts a statutory
habitability standard also has the power to provide for housing codes
by either statewide enactment or local enabling legislation.
Finally, a habitability standard tied closely to a housing code may be
rigidly applied and leave courts no room for exercise of their discretion
in expanding the standard or modifying it to fit circumstances. 03 Con-
100. Even though the tenant may be unable to rely upon an underlying housing code,
the URLTA provides relief in such a case, affording relief pursuant to section 4.101 for
any failure of the landlord to comply with the terms of the lease or of section 2.104, in-
cluding the requirement in section 2.104(a) (4) that air conditioners be properly main-
tained. If the lease stipulates that swimming facilities be furnished, failure to do so w",ill
invoke the sanctions of section 4.101.
101. One court following the broad implied warranty doctrine attempted to specify
certain defects which would constitute a breach and those which clearly would not.
Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 111 N.J. Super. 477,-, 268 A.2d 556, 559 (Dist. Ct. 1970).
Heat, hot water, garbage disposal, and elevator service were denominated "bare living
requirements," as contrasted with "amenities," and failure to supply any of these would
violate the covenant of habitability. Malfunctioning venetian blinds, water leaks, wall
cracks, and minor painting deficiencies were not defects justifying an abatement of rent
on the basis of uninhabitability. Id.
102. "Hundreds of thousands of people live in jurisdictions which do not have a hous-
ing code which establishes minimum standards of health, safety and welfare in all ex-
isting housing." NATiONAL CoMMissoN, supra note 39, at 22. Code standards in many
areas are said to be "surprisingly low." Id. "[Hiundreds of. cities and counties, most
States, and virtually all rural areas do not have housing codes." Id. at 275.
103. Not only is the housing code used as a standard by the URLTA, the Act also
lists several specific items for which the landlord is responsible. URLTA § 2.104(a).
Section 2.104(b), however, makes clear that if the housing code standard is more rigorous
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versely, the "all facts and circumstances" test employed by some courts
permits greater flexibility in molding remedies that meet the particular
needs and expectations of the parties, a desideratum which led to the
abandonment of the old common law rules in the first instance. 1 4
Lest it be concluded that the broad discretion associated with most
judicial versions of the habitability standard benefits tenants, a cau-
tionary note should be sounded. That a flexible standard produces un-
certainty concerning what constitutes a breach of the standard can have
serious implications for tenants. Several notable cases have been criti-
cized for stating a broad general rule granting trial courts wide dis-
cretion to decide the factual question of whether the warranty has
been breached without establishing adequate standards for the exercise
of such discretion.105 Although granting wide discretion to the trial
court need not directly harm tenants, it may cause tenants to be hesitant
to use a remedy such as withholding rent for fear that the supposed
breach of warranty will be found insufficient to justify such action. 06
In addition, the landlord may delay making repairs in the hope that
the breach will be found insubstantial if a resulting dispute is litigated.'
Thus, neither the housing code standard nor the more flexible judicial
standard of habitability is indisputably superior, either objectively or
from the tenant's viewpoint. In seeking a compromise incorporating both
standards, the URLTA places basic reliance upon the housing code
standard, section 2.104 requiring that the landlord comply with appli-
cable housing codes materially affecting health and safety. °8 Courts
are invited to expand on this basic requirement by a subsequent pro-
vision which obligates a landlord "to put and keep the premises in a fit
and habitable condition."'' 09 In addition to this general mandate, specific
duties are imposed on the landlord by section 2.104, including a provi-
sion that, if the local housing code standards are more stringent than
than the Act's other standards, the housing code must be used as the yardstick of the
landlord's compliance.
104. See Tenant Protection, supra note 39, at 672.
105. See Current Interest, supra note 39, at 386-87, where the Javins and Mease deci-
sions are discussed. A similar criticism of Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 162, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 661 (1972), is found in 77 DicK. L. REv. 185, 193 (1972).
106. Current Interest, supra note 39, at 387. See also 84 HA~v. L. REV. 729, 737-38
(1971). An analogy is made to the old constructive eviction doctrine, under which the
tenant was forced to vacate with the risk that the alleged interference with his enjoyment
of the premises would be found insufficient to have constituted an eviction.
107. Current Interest, supra note 39, at 387.
108. URLTA § 2.104(a) (1).
109. Id. § 2.104(a) (2).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
the duties imposed by the Act, the housing code standards shall con-
trol.110 The comment to this section points out that housing code
standards involve an exercise of the public police power, not limited
to landlord-tenant or contractual relationships. Hence, the section only
"establishes minimum duties of landlords consistent with the public
standards.""' Standards beyond the minimum are left to judicial develop-
ment.
Although the Act's two-layered standard of habitability does not
eliminate the shortcomings of the component standards entirely, neither
does it take from the landlord and tenant any advantage that might
have been gained by independent judicial development of the standards.
Landlord Obligations and Tenant Remedies
Habitability
Section 2.104 of the Act explicates the functions the landlord must
perform to fulfill his primary obligation of maintaining the premises.
He must comply with "applicable building and housing codes materially
affecting health and safety,"" 2 "make all repairs and do whatever else
is necessary to put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable condi-
tion,"113 "keep all common areas ... in a clean and safe condition,"1 4
maintain utilities and appliances "in good and safe working order,"5"
provide receptacles and removal service for garbage and other waste,"8
and supply running water, including ample hot water, and necessary
heat.'-" Section 2.104 contains provisions which allow the landlord to
agree with the tenant that the latter shall perform certain repair and
maintenance duties," 8 but adequate safeguards are supplied to prevent
abuse of this privilege." 0 Further protection is afforded the tenant by
110. Id. § 2.104(b).
111. Id. § 2.104, Comment (emphasis supplied).
112. Id. § 2.104(a) (1).
113. Id. § 2.104(a)(2).
114. Id. § 2.104(a) (3).
115. Id. § 2.104(a) (4).
116. Id. § 2.104(a) (5).
117. Id. § 2.104(a) (6).
118. Id. § 2.104(c), (d).
119. Such an arrangement must be "entered into in good faith and not for the purpose
of evading the obligations of the landlord." Id. § 2.104(c), (d) (1). No such arrangement
may be entered into to cure a building or housing code violation. Id. § 2.104(d) (2). No
such arrangement may be entered into which will "diminish or affect the obligation of
the landlord to other tenants in the premises." Id. § 2.104(d) (3). The performance of
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section 1.404, which forbids the conveyance or assignment of the land-
lord's right to receive rents to a party who does not undertake to main-
tain the premises as required by section 2.104.120
In the event of a breach of the landlord's obligations, the tenant has
available a variety of remedies, some of which are available generally
and others of which are designed to redress specific types of landlord
default. A fundamental tenant remedy found in section 4.101 con-
fers on the tenant the right to terminate a rental agreement for material
noncompliance by the landlord with terms of the rental agreement or
noncompliance with section 2.104 "materially affecting health and
safety."' ' At least 30 days before termination, the tenant must notify
the landlord of the breach, and the landlord is given 14 days to correct
it. An exception to this provision arises when substantially the same
noncompliance was the subject of similar notice by the tenant within
the preceeding six months; in such case the tenant need give only 14 days
notice, the landlord apparently having lost his right to cure the de-
fect. 22 In addition to terminating the lease, the tenant may recover
actual damages and obtain injunctive relief for any noncompliance
by the landlord with the rental agreement or with section 2.104.123
The tenant is authorized to employ self-help measures to remedy
minor defects. 24 Specifically, if there is a breach of the landlord's obli-
duties by the tenant under such an arrangement will not be treated as a condition prece-
dent to the performance of any duty by the landlord. Id. § 2.104(e).
120. This provision is amplified by the statement in the official comment that "the
rights and remedies of the tenant under Articles 1H and IV cannot be defeated or
thwarted by the assignment of rents." Id. § 1.404, Comment.
121. Id. § 4.101(a).
122. Id. The termination right is akin to rescission, which has been criticized as being
of little assistance to the tenant. See Daniels, supra note 39, at 927-28. Such remedies are
said to be "of virtually no advantage to the low-income tenant," conferring "illusory
benefits of little more value to the low-income tenant than the municipal code enforce-
ment remedy of an order to demolish" and representing only a marginal improvement
over common law constructive eviction. Id. It is claimed that the indigent tenant will be
unable to utilize such a remedy where there is a critical housing shortage. Id. Were this
the only remedy provided by the URLTA, the validity of such criticism would be be-
yond question; however, termination is only one of several options available to the ag-
grieved tenant. It is the preferable option, however, in cases involving a severe breach
of the landlord's obligations when an opportunity to obtain other housing exists.
123. URLTA § 4.101 (b). Although it would appear from the language of this section
that termination of the lease, actual damages, and injunctive relief are cumulative reme-
dies, logic would indicate that termination and injunctive relief must be mutually ex-
clusive. For a discussion of the possible implications of this section, see note 393
infra & accompanying text.
124. URLTA § 4.103.
WILLIAUM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:845
gations under terms of the lease or section 2.104 and the reasonable cost
of compliance is less than 100 dollars or one-half the periodic rent, which-
ever amount is greater, the tenant may cause the repairs to be made and de-
duct their cost from his rent,125 provided he first notifies the landlord of
his intention and allows the landlord a reasonable opportunity to re-
pair.126 Some uncertainty may arise concerning this remedy because
it is unclear whether the dollar limitation is per defect, per month, or
per tenancy. 27 Although some clarification would be advisable, the
substance of the remedy is plain; it furnishes a simplified method by
which the tenant can correct minor defects on his own initiative without
resort to more drastic measures such as termination of the lease or insti-
tution -of legal proceedings.""
Section 4.104 provides a specific remedy where the landlord willfully
or negligently fails to supply heat, utilities, or other essential services. 129
After notifying the landlord, the tenant may procure these services
himself and deduct their cost from the rent;'8 0 alternatively, he may
recover damages based upon the diminution in fair rental value of the
premises due to lack of these services 31 or procure substitute housing
at the landlord's expense during the period of the landlord's noncom-
pliance. 32 Relief under section 4.104 cannot be used to supplement
125. Id. § 4.103 (a).
126. Id.
127. Subcommittee, supra note 2, at 116-17; Strum, Proposed Uniform Residential
Landlord and Tenant Act: A Departure from Traditional Concepts, 8 REAL PROP.,
PROB. & TR. J. 495, 500 (1973).
128. Daniels, supra note 39, at 939, states that a dollar limitation on this type of remedy
is not necessary: "[Als a practical matter, the remedy will be used to make only minor
repairs and not for correcting badly run-down properties, since tenants and tenant or-
ganizations simply do not have ready capital to finance major repairs." This assessment
seems to ignore the possibility that there could be instances in which tenants will at-
tempt major repairs. For the landlord to retain some control over what is done to his
property, it seems reasonable to impose some limitation. See Subcommittee, supra note
2, at 116.
129. URLTA § 4.104.
130. Id. § 4.104(a) (1).
131. Id. § 4.104(a) (2).
132. Id. § 4.104(a) (3). The tenant is also excused from paying rent during the period
of noncompliance. Id. Since the tenant is so excused and can recover the reasonable
cost of substitute housing as long as it is not greater than the periodic rent, id. § 4.104(b),
the question is raised whether these two "costs" to the landlord are meant to be cumu-
lative. The plain language of section 4.104 suggests an affirmative answer; the landlord
is, in effect, liable for a form of punitive damages, being deprived of his rent and, during
the same period, being required to pay the cost of the tenant's substitute housing. Con-
versely, the tenant can "live for free" during this period, at the landlord's expense. This
remedy is viewed in one commentary as a form of rent withholding. Note, The Uniform
relief under the general termination, damages, and self-help provisions."3'
Like the other forms of tenant redress in the Act, this remedy is not
available until the landlord has been notified or in situations in which the
defective condition resulted from the tenant's deliberate or negligent
actions.3 4
The Act also provides a limited remedy to the tenant who is the victim
of unlawful ouster or exclusion from the premises, including ouster
caused by the willful interruption of essential services by the land-
lord.'35 In such a case the tenant can recover possession or terminate
the lease and, in either case, recover a limited amount of punitive
damages, plus attorney's fees.1 6 This remedy, however, is not related
directly to the landlord's failure to furnish a habitable dwelling but
rather concerns improper attempts to evict the tenant from the premises.
Also altered by the Act is the common law rule that the tenant re-
mains obligated to pay rent when his leasehold is impaired by fire or
other casualty, even though the premises become uninhabitable. Under
the Act, the tenant may vacate all or part of the premises and deduct
rent accordingly.137
Finally, in addition to the direct remedies provided under the
URLTA, the tenant is permitted to counterclaim for damages re-
coverable under the lease or the Act in an action by the landlord for
possession or rent.3 8 By linking the landlord's right to possession and
rent with performance of his own duties, the counterclaim provision
abrogates the common law theory of independent covenants. 39 The
Residcntial Landlord and Tenant Act: Reconciling Landlord-Tenant Law with Modern
Realities, 6 I-N. L. Rnv. 741, 761 (1973). Rent withholding, however, is merely an in-
terim measure providing no assurance that the tenant will not be required to pay rent
for the period of withholding upon an adverse adjudication of his claim. In other words,
rent withholding allows a suspension of the rental obligation, while section 4.104 (a)
(3) excuses the tenant from paying the rent until termination of the noncompliance. It
would appear that, because of the egregious nature of the breach involved (failure to
supply essential services), the draftsmen intended that the section have a punitive effect
upon the landlord.
133. URLTA § 4.104(c). The official comments indicate, however, that the remedy
provided by section 4.107 for the landlord's unlawful ouster, exclusion, or diminution
of services may be used in conjunction with the section 4.104 remedies. Id. § 4.104,
Comment; § 4.107, Comment. See notes 135-37 infra & accompanying text for a discussion
of the remedies provided in section 4.107.
134. URLTA § 4.104(d).
135. Id. § 4.107.
136. Id.
137. Id. § 4.106.
138. Id. § 4.105.
139. See id. § 4.105, Comment.
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provision, in effect, authorizes the tenant to withhold rent 40 in the
event of a breach of the landlord's duties which the tenant deems to be
a bona fide justification for a damage claim, placing the burden on the
landlord to institute legal action for rent owed or for possession for
nonpayment of rent.14' After adjudication of the legal status of the
parties, the tenant may remain in possession if he satisfies whatever rental
obligation the court finds that he owes.14 If the tenant has vacated the
premises after withholding rent, he may nevertheless assert his counter-
claim for damages in an action by the landlord for rent.1 43
Measure of Damages for Failure to Maintain Habitability
Both the case law and the URLTA recognize damages as one form
of relief available to an aggrieved tenant upon proof of a breach of the
landlord's obligation to maintain the premises. In contrast to the
specificity with which the landlord's duties are set out in the Act, meas-
urement of damages available to the aggrieved tenant under the Act
receives sketchy treatment, the tenant being allowed to recover "actual
damages. '1 .44 No additional meaning is given this phrase by the official
comments, nor is the phrase clarified by the general requirement of the
Act that remedies "be so administered that an aggrieved party may
recover appropriate damages."' 45
The absence of a specific measure in the URLTA may be due to
the fact that the case law on damages appears settled. If the tenant has
not vacated the premises, damages, according to the judicial standard, are
the difference between the rental value of the premises as warranted
and the actual rental value. If he has been improperly evicted, either ac-
tually or constructively, the tenant may recover the amount by
140. Note, supra note 132, at 761-63; Subcommittee, supra note 2, at 118.
141. The court may, in its discretion, order the payment of the rent withheld into
court pending its determination of the rights of the parties. URLTA § 4.105(a).
142. id.
143. Id. § 4.105(b). Although rent withholding has been allowed by judicial decision
and statutes in various jurisdictions, some courts have effectively disallowed it by refusing
to permit assertion of an affirmative defense by the tenant as a counterclaim in a sum-
mary proceeding by the landlord. See Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Il. 2d 351, 368-70,
280 N.E.2d 208, 218-19 (1972) (permitting assertion of a tenant counterclaim), where
the dissenting opinion stated that the Illinois summary proceeding previously had been
used "solely for obtaining possession of real estate, regardless of the question of rent due
or damages sustained." Id. at 369, 280 NE.2d at 219.
144. URLTA 5 4.101(b).
145. Id. § 1.105 (a) (emphasis supplied).
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which the rental value of the premises over the unexpired term of his
lease exceeds the rent he would have paid had he not vacated. 146
A court attempting to determine the amount of damages recoverable
by a tenant under the URLTA is likely to resort to the recognized ju-
dicial measure of damages.147 Although the failure to supply a damage
formula may be seen as a shortcoming of the Act,'48 there is less need
146. In Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972), the court discussed the measure
of damages as follows:
Where there has been a material breach of implied warranty, tenant's dam-
ages shall be measured by the difference between the fair rental value of
the premises if they had been as warranted and the fair rental value of
the premises as they were during occupancy by the tenant in the un-
safe or unsanitary condition. . . . When tenant vacates he is then unaf-
fected by the condition of the premises, and that factor loses relevance
in the damage equation. For the balance of the term, tenant has lost the
benefit of his bargain, assuming he has an advantageous lease. He is there-
fore entitled to recover at that time for the value of the lease for the unex-
pired term, that is, the then difference between the fair value of the pre-
mises if they had been as warranted and the promised rent, computed for
that period .... In all events, tenant should have the incidental and conse-
quential damages which fall within the general principles governing the al-
lowance of such damages.
Id. at 797. See also King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 75 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
147. URLTA § 1.103 provides: "Unless displaced by the provisions of this Act, the
principles of law and equity... supplement its provisions."
148. That the lack of a damage formula may create problems, especially for an in-
digent tenant, is demonstrated in Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 111 N.J. Super. 477,
268 A.2d 556 (Dist. Ct. 1970), where the court noted: "The most difficult aspect of this
case is determination of the amount of abatement to which tenant is entitled." Id. at -,
268 A.2d at 561. The court adopted the standard breach of warranty measure of damages
used in most cases of implied warranty, despite its recognition of the difficulties of
proof that employment of such a measure of. damages entails. Id. at -, 268 A.2d at 561-
62. In view of these difficulties, it was held that the tenant need not produce expert testi-
mony to prove damages, so long as the evidence showed the amount of damages "as
a matter of just and reasonable inference, although the result be only approximate." Id.
at -, 268 A.2d at 562, quoting Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson, 282 U.. 555, 563 (1931).
It was observed: "Certainly, if tenant were required to bear the cost of producing an
expert witness, the effectiveness of the relief afforded . . . would be diminished." 111
NJ. Super. at -, 268 A.2d at 556. The court agreed to use a "percentage abatement"
theory and arrived at what it felt was a "fair amount." Id. at -, 268 A.2d. at 562. This
method of determining tenant damages has been deemed desirable, since developing case
law would eventually establish "going rates" for different housing code violations,
thereby facilitating application of the formula. 84 HAxv. L. REv. 729, 737 (1971).
Also relevant is the burden of proof when the tenant seeks recovery of damages. See
Daniels, supra note 39, at 935-37. Where the tenant is seeking damages either as a plain-
tiff in an action against the landlord or in a counterclaim in a suit by the landlord for
rent or possession, he undoubtedly would bear the burden of proof on the issue of the
amount of damages. As a means of obviating the need for expert testimony to prove the
diminution in rental value due to defects, the Academy Spires approach seems meritori-
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to establish certainty in the measurement of damages than in the de-
termination of landlord obligations. Both tenant and landlord need
to be apprised of the precise nature of the duties owed; otherwise, an
element of risk enters into the relationship in that imprecision may in-
duce a party to rely, to his detriment, upon a misinterpretation of the
landlord's obligations. Detrimental reliance upon a miscalculation of
recoverable damages, however, seems unlikely.
Landlord's Duty to Deliver Possession
A new tenant seeking to enter the premises which he has just leased
may discover that they are occupied by a previous tenant under an
expired lease, by a third party intruder occupying the premises without
any colorable right to do so, by the landlord himself, or by another
tenant holding paramount title from the landlord. Absent statutory
guidance 149 or an express covenant in the lease agreement,' 0 a landlord
gives each tenant an implied covenant that he will transfer possession
of the premises to him at the beginning of the tenancy; 5' the case
law, however, is divided with respect to the nature of "possession."
One group of jurisdictions applies what is known as the "American"
rule, which guarantees to a tenant only legal possession of the premises,
an obligation satisfied merely by granting the tenant a right to immediate
possession free from any interference by either the landlord or one
claiming under him. 52 The landlord incurs no liability if holdover
tenants or third parties occupy the premises, the ouster of such parties
being left to the new tenant 153 who, meanwhile, remains liable to his
landlord for all rental payments due under the lease agreement.154
ous. See Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Velez, 73 Misc. 2d 996, 343 N.Y.S.2d 406 (N.Y.
City Civ. Ct. 1973); Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Rosenshine, 67 Misc. 2d 325, 323 N.Y.S.2d
363 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1971). In both cases, the trial courts arrived at percentage
values for abatement of rent apparently without the aid of expert testimony.
149. See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 223-a (MeKinney 1968).
150. Fox Realty Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 124 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1941); Nodine
v. State, 192 Misc. 572, 79 N.Y.S.2d 834 (Ct. Cl. 1948).
151. Johnson v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. Ry. Co., 216 S.W.2d 499, 503 (Mo. 1949); Cana-
day v. Krueger, 156 Neb. 287, 291, 56 N.W.2d 123, 127 (1952); Shelton v. Clinard, 187
N.C. 664, 122 SE. 477 (1924); Dougherty v. Thomas, 313 Pa. 287, 169 A. 219 (1933);
Hannan v. Dusch, 154 Va. 356, 153 SE. 824 (1930); Poposkey v. Munkwitz, 68 WIS. 322,
32 N.W. 35 (1887).
152. Jenkins v. Smith, 92 Ga. App. 296, 88 S.E.2d 533 (1955); Cobb v. Lavalle, 89 Il.
331 (1878); Snider v. Deban, 249 Mass. 59, 144 NE. 69 (1924); Ward v. Hudson, 199
Miss. 171, 24 So. 2d 329 (1946); Dougherty v. Thomas, 313 Pa. 287, 169 A. 219 (1933);
Hannan v. Dusch, 154 Va. 356, 153 SE. 824 (1930).
153. Hannan v. Dusch, 154 Va. 356, 153 SE. 824 (1930).
154. The American rule is supported by several rationales: the new tenant has ade-
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Other jurisdictions impose a greater duty upon landlords by applying
the "English" rule,15r which requires the landlord to deliver actual, as
vell as legal, possession.156 Tenants are entitled to immediate occupancy
and have no obligation to oust a third party in wrongful possession;""1
the landlord must remove all such obstacles or find himself in breach
of the contract.""' The results under the English rule align more closely
quate remedies at his disposal with which to combat the wrongdoer; the landlord should
not be responsible for another not under his control; and it is not the landlord's duty
to shield another party from lawsuits. Gardner v. Keteltas & McCarty, 3 Hill 330, 38
Am. Dec. 637 (N.Y. 1842), approved in United Merchants Realty & Improvement Co. v.
Roth, 193 N.Y. 570, 572, 86 N.E. 544, 546 (1908); Hannan v. Dusch, 154 Va. 356, 153 S.E.
824 (1930). The American rule has been adopted in the following: Lost Key Mines,
Inc. v. Hamilton, 109 Cal. App. 2d 569, 241 P.2d 273 (1952); Judd v. Ladd, 1 Hawaii 13
(1847); People v. Mattingly, 106 IM. App. 2d 74, 245 N.E.2d 647 (1969); Rice v. Biltmore
Apts. Co., 141 Md. 507, 119 A. 364 (1922); Snider v. Deban, 249 Mass. 59, 144 NE. 69
(1924); Ward v. Hudson, 199 Miss. 171, 24 So. 2d 329 (1946); Pendergast v. Young, 21
N.H. 234 (1850); Underwood v. Birchard, 47 Vt. 305 (1875).
155. The various rationales underlying the rule include implied promises or covenants
to place tenants in actual possession, Chesire v. Thurston, 70 Ariz. 299, 219 P.2d 1043
(1950); Bloch v. Busch, 160 Tenn. 21, 22 S.W.2d 242 (1929); and the warranty of quiet
enjoyment, Kammerer v. U.S. Silica Co., 196 Ill. App. 527 (1915); Ft. Terrett Ranch Co.
v. Bell, 275 S.W. 81 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925). Application of the warranty of quiet en-
joyment will be of no assistance in many cases, due to the tendency of some courts
to disallow tenants' recovery if they have never taken actual possession of the premises.
Schwartzman v. Wilmington Stores Co., 32 Del. 362, 123 A. 343 (1924); Stiger v. Mon-
roe, 109 Ga. 457, 34 S.E. 595 (1899).
156. Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Missouri, Nebraska,
New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, and Tennessee follow the English rule. 2 R. Pow-
ELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 225[11] n.2 (P. Rohan ed. 1973). See also Chesire v.
Thurston, 70 Ariz. 299, 219 P.2d 1043 (1950); Baxley v. Davenport, 75 Ga. App. 659,
44 S.E.2d 388 (1947); Wallace v. Carter, 133 Kan. 303, 299 P. 966 (1931); Barfield v.
Damon, 56 N.M. 515, 245 P.2d 1032 (1952); Mullins v. Brown, 87 Ohio App. 427, 94
N.E.2d 574 (1950); Dieffenbach v. McIntyre, 208 Okla. 163, 254 P.2d 346 (1952); Oriental
Oil Co. v. Lindsey, 33 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930); Shreiner v. Stanton, 26 Wash.
563 (1901); Huntington Easy Payments Co. v. Parsons, 62 W. Va. 26, 57 S.E. 253 (1907);
Gross v. Heckert, 120 Wis. 314 (1904).
New York, an early adherent to the American rule in Teitelbaum v. Direct Realty
Co., 172 Misc. 48, 13 N.Y.S.2d 886 (Sup. Cr. 1939), reversed its position in 1962 by the
following statute:
In the absence of an express provision to the contrary, there shall be
implied in every lease of real property a condition that the lessor will de-
liver possession at the beginning of the term. In the event of breach of
such implied condition the lessee shall have the right to rescind the lease
and to recover the consideration paid.
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 223-a (McKinney 1968).
157. Adrian v. Rabinowitz, 116 N.J.L. 586, 186 A. 29 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
158. Rice v. Whitmore, 74 Cal. 619, 16 P. 501 (1888); Herpolsheimer v. Christopher,
76 Neb. 352, 111 N.W. 359 (1907); Shelton v. Clinard, 187 N.C. 664, 122 S.E. 477 (1924).
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with the expectations of the parties at formation of the lease agree-
ment.15 9
Apparently unwilling to choose between the American and English
rules, the draftsmen of the URLTA left the definition of possession to
state law, stating: "At the commencement of the term a landlord shall
deliver possession of the premises to the tenant in compliance with the
rental agreement ....",,160 Neither this provision, the comment thereto,
nor the tenant remedy provided for failure of the landlord to deliver
possession 61 indicate which party shall bear the burden of ousting a
third party wrongfully on the premises. Notwithstanding adoption of the
URLTA in a given jurisdiction, resolution of this question thus will
depend upon the rule traditionally applied by its courts.
Upon establishing a failure to deliver possession, the tenant is entitled,
under the URLTA, to rent abatement, 162 a reflection of the common
law tenet that possession by the tenant is a condition precedent to his
obligation to pay rent under either the American or English rules." 3
Once denied possession the tenant has the option to rescind the lease
agreement 64 or bring an action for possession against the landlord or any
wrongdoer and recover actual damages. 165
The lease rescission remedy retains the common law right of a tenant
to repudiate the lease agreement upon a failure to deliver possession'O
but, by incorporating a notice requirement, departs from the common
law, which required no prior demand upon the landlord. 67 A notice
requirement encourages disclosure 'of intentions between the parties
and places no inordinate burden on tenants; however, since the Act
does not provide for summary proceedings, 6 8 the five-day requirement
suggested' 69 may be too short to permit the landlord to remove holdover
159. Comment, Exclusion of Tenant From Possession, 3 Mo. L. REv. 299, 302 (1938).
160. URLTA § 2.103 (emphasis supplied).
161. Id. § 4.102.
162. Id. § 4.102(a).
163. Farmers' & Merchants' Nat'l Bank v. Bailie, 138 Cal. App. 143, 145, 32 P.2d 157,
159 (1934).
164. URLTA § 4.102(a) (1).
165. Id. § 4.102 (a) (2).
166. Rispin v. Midnight Oil Co., 291 F. 481 (9th Cir. 1923); Lalekos v. Manset, 47
A.2d 617 (D.C. Mun. App. 1946); Forshaw v. Hathaway, 112 Misc. 112, 182 N.Y.. 646
(Sup. Ct. 1920); Hessel v. Johnson, 129 Pa. 173, 18 A. 754 (1889).
167. Murdock v. Roe, 186 Mich. 233, 152 N.W. 969 (1915); Driggs v. Dwight 17
Wend. 71, 31 Am. Dec. 283 (N.Y. 1837).
168. Trends in Landlord-Tenant Law Including Model Code, 6 REAL Paop., PaoB. &
Ta. J. 550, 579 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Trends].
169. URLTA § 4.102(a) (1).
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tenants or challenge other claims to the premises. This problem may be
alleviated as the Act is adopted in individual states by tailoring the time
allowed for notice to the usual length of summary proceedings in the
jurisdiction.
For the new tenant who has been denied possession but desires to
institute an action for possession rather than rescind, the Act resolves
several problems existing under present rules of pleading and practice.
Jurisdictions are split concerning the right of a tenant who has not
previously been in possession to maintain an action in ejectment. Al-
though a majority of jurisdictions permit such actions, 70 in a substantial
minority the tenant who has not made a prior entry may not rely on
ejectment.Y17 In providing that "[i]f the landlord fails to deliver posses-
sion... the tenant may... maintain an action for possession... against
... any person wrongfully in possession,"' 72 the Act accords with the
majority rule in permitting ouster of the trespasser irrespective of prior
entry by the tenant. This language also eliminates the distinction existing
in certain jurisdictions between actions to oust holdover tenants and
actions to oust intruders who are strangers to the landlord, the latter
type of action being nonmaintainable by a tenant who has made no
prior entry even though the former type of action would be allowed
under the same circumstances1 3 Finally, the availability of summary
proceedings, which in many jurisdictions is predicated upon a plaintiff's
prior entry and possession, is not so limited under the Act.7 4
Parties who may be made defendants to a tenant's action for posses-
sion are named disjunctively in the Act, 7 indicating retention of the
common law rule that there may be no joinder of the landlord and the
third party in possession.Y7 Nevertheless, the provision does represent
an advance over the rule in some jurisdictions which, by prohibiting
the use of summary proceedings by a tenant against one other than his
landlord, limits the new tenant's ability to oust a holdover tenant. 77
170. E.g., Ewert v. Robinson, 289 F. 740 (8th Cir. 1923); Gardner v. Keteltas & Mc-
Carty, 3 Hill 330, 38 Am. Dec. 637 (N.Y. 1842).
171. E.g., Dime Bank & Trust Co. v. Walsh, 143 Pa. Super. 189, 17 A.2d 728 (1941).
172. URLTA § 4.102(a).
173. Anderson v. Kokomo Rubber Co, 161 Ga. 842, 132 S.E. 76 (1926).
174. The Act makes no specific provision for summary proceedings. See note 168 supra
& accompanying text. Thus, the tenant's "action for possession," URLTA § 4.102 (a) (2),
would encompass such summary proceedings as are available under other state law.
175. URLTA § 4.102 (a) (2) provides that an action may be maintained "for posses-
sion of the dwelling unit against the landlord or any person wrongfully in posses-
sion... :'
176. Hughes v. Hood, 50 Mo. 350 (1872).
177. Smith v. Feigin, 190 Misc. 461, 75 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. 1947), rev'd on other
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As noted, tenants in American rule jurisdictions will continue under
the URLTA to bear the obligation of bringing action themselves to
wrest possession from the wrongful occupant of the leased premises.
Burdensome though this obligation may be, it is lightened considerably
by the damage provisions -of the Act. Not only may the tenant who is
successful in his action for possession recover "actual" damages,178
which would appear to encompass the consequential damages incurred
as a result of having to reside elsewhere,17 but punitive damages also
may be awarded upon proof that "failure to deliver possession is willful
and not in good faith ... ."180 The measure of damages suggested by
the Act, either three months' rent or three times the tenant's actual
damages, whichever is greater, plus reasonable attorney's fees, 8' should
deter deliberate attempts to interfere with a tenant's rightful possession
of his dwelling unit. Moreover, the inclusion of attorney's fees elim-
inates perhaps the single most objectionable feature of the American
rule from the tenant's standpoint, namely, the cost of legal representa-
tion necessary to secure possession. Permitting the award of attorney's
fees substantially increases the likelihood that a tenant will, in fact,
pursue an action for possession, thereby further increasing the deterrent
value of the punitive damages provision.
Although the generous damages available under the Act alleviate the
burdens borne by the tenant in American rule jurisdictions, the dis-
tinctions between the American and English rules would not be elim-
inated. From a tenant's standpoint, the English rule remains preferable.
The provisions of the Model Residential Landlord-Tenant Code govern-
ing the landlord's duty to deliver possession 8 2 expressly incorporate
the English rule.'3 Such a rule accords better with the modern con-
tractual approach to landlord-tenant law because it places the parties
in the positions for which they bargained, the tenant having a right to
full possession of the premises and the landlord having the duty to de-
liver that possession.
In summary, the URLTA falls short of the goals tenants doubtless
grounds, 273 App. Div. 277, 77 N.Y.S.2d (1948); Cannon v. Gordon, 181 Misc. 950,
48 N.Y.S.2d 124 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
178. URLTA § 4.102 (a) (2).
179. One commentator has expressed doubt as to the availability of consequential
damages. Subcommittee, supra note 2, at 111.
180. URLTA § 4.102(b).
181. Id.
182. MODEL CODF, supra note 5, § 2-201.
183. Id. §2-202, Comment.
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would set for legislation in this area. Although the tenant who has not
yet entered the premises has full standing under the Act to oust a wrong-
ful occupant-a significant advance in many jurisdictions-a better rule
would allow him to look to the landlord to perform that function.
Security Deposits
Residential lease agreements typically provide for advance payment
by the tenant of a sum of money to be held by the landlord during the
tenancy as security against default in rent or damage to the premises
exceeding normal wear and tear. These security deposits are for the
sole benefit of the landlord, and the competitive ability of landlords
to demand and obtain such deposits directly reflects the tightness of the
housing market.8 4 Present law is inadequate to deal with the potential
and actual abuses inherent in such a one-sided situation; in the great
majority of jurisdictions, a landlord is limited only by his considerable
bargaining power in negotiation of security deposits. Accordingly,
the subservient role of the tenant in such matters is undergoing an
examination whch has engendered novel thinking.""
Unfairness to the tenant may arise from several aspects of the ad-
ministration of security deposits, including the size of the deposit de-
manded, the conditions surrounding return of the deposit, the various
rights and duties arising upon assignment of the landlord's interest in
the deposit, the landlord's freedom to use the money deposited for his
own purposes, the landlord's right to retain any interest or investment
profits earned by the deposit, and the tenant's priority in the deposit
vis-a-is creditors of the landlord upon the landlord's insolvency. The
URLTA encompasses several steps taken towards alleviating possible
overreaching by the landlord, although it falls short of covering all the
areas which merit legislative attention.
The amount of the security deposit which the landlord may exact as a
condition to the execution of a lease has rarely, if ever, been reviewed
judicially, although in recent years a few state legislatures have initiated
a minority trend toward establishing legal maximums for security de-
posits. 80 Such regulation is essential to prevent landlords from taking
184. The United States has changed from a country that was 64 percent urban in
1950 to one that was 73.5 percent urban in 1970. U.S. BUurAu OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABsTATr or Tn UNITE STA"Ts: 1971. See Trends, supra note 168, at 550-57; Current
Interest, supra note 39.
185. See OtrrTauo LAw RoFoRm ComissioN, LANDLORD AND TENANT LAw APPLICABLE
To REmENTAL TENANcIEs 21, 28 (Interim Report 1968).
186. ARM. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1321(A) (Supp. 1973) (maximum of one and one-
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unfair advantage of the intensifying lessors' market to collect larger
deposits than realistically are needed. None of the statutes states a maxi-
mum amount in terms of an absolute dollar limit, tying the maximum
amount instead to the monthly rental, with limits ranging between one
and two months' rent. This approach reserves to the landlord some
flexibility in setting appropriate deposit amounts, since the monthly
rental generally will be commensurate with the value of the leased
property and furnishings and, therefore, will reflect the potential for
damage against which the landlord must protect himself.8 7
Prior state statutes provided the model for the URLTA provision
which suggests that security deposits be limited to an amount equivalent
to one month's rent,18 the amount customarily given as a security de-
posit.18 9 Such a deposit would adequately protect landlords against
loss caused by a tenant's midterm departure from the premises since
little difficulty should be experienced in reletting the premises; likewise,
the amount ordinarily should cover physical damage in unfurnished
premises. Arguably, however, a deposit equal to one month's rent could
prove inadequate in the case of a furnished dwelling where the extent
of possible damage is substantially greater.9 0
Abuses of the security deposit system occur most commonly after
the termination of the tenancy even though tenants have a common
law right to immediate return of security deposits at that time, either in
full if all the terms of the lease agreement have been met or as reduced
by valid landlord claims.' 9" Notwithstanding this right, tenants frequent-
half months' rental); HAwAI Rnv. STAT. § 521-44(b) (Supp. 1972) (maximum of one
month's rental); MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, § 8-213(b) (Rep1. Vol. 1973) (maximum of
two months' rental or 50 dollars, whichever is greater); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 186,
S 15B (Supp. 1973) (maximum of two months' rental); N.J. STAT. AN. § 46:8-21.2
(Supp. 1973) (maximum of one and one-half. months' rental); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69,
§ 250.511a (Supp. 1973) (maximum of two months' rental during first year, maximum of
one month's rental during second and succeeding years).
187. The effectiveness of these floating maximums is vitiated whenever a landlord is
able to charge exorbitant rent disproportionate to the value of the rental property be-
cause of the uncompetitive nature of the local market.
188. URLTA § 2.101(a).
189. See generally 1 CCH Pov. L. REP. 2035 (1972). The fact that the practice of
setting security deposits at one month's rental is so widespread may account for the
paucity of cases in the area. For a discussion of the several considerations affecting the
amount of a security deposit, see Wilson, Lease Security Deposits, 34 CoLUTm. L. RIv.
426 (1934).
190. Subcommittee, supra note 2, at 109. This commentary suggests that the drafts-
men of the URLTA have overlooked the peculiar problems of the furnished dwelling.
191. Auker v. Gerald, 61 111. App. 2d 425, 214 N.E.2d 618 (1966); Westbrook v.
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ly encounter negligent or willful retention of their deposits by careless
or unscrupulous landlords. With the tenant having vacated the premises,
the landlord has no risk in terms of rent withholding or damage to the
premises. Thus lacking any practical leverage, the tenant's only re-
course is to legal action, a step rarely justified by the amount in
controversy. 192
Statutory response to the tenant's plight has been varied. Legislation
in many states limits the time during which landlords must refund
security deposits to periods ranging from 14 to 45 days,'9" and most of
these statutes provide for mandatory written notice to the tenant of any
amounts to be withheld by the landlord.9 Recognizing that noncom-
Masonic Manor, 185 Neb. 660, 178 N.W.2d 280 (1970); Tuteur v. P.&F. Enterprises,
Inc., 21 Ohio App. 2d 122, 255 N.E.2d 284 (1970); Datz v. Wolfe, 42 Misc. 2d 956, 249
N.Y.S.2d 586 (Dist. Ct. 1964); Green v Frahm, 176 Cal. 259, 168 P. 114 (1917); Security
Deposits and Guaranties Under Leases, 1 REArL PROP., PROB. & Th. J., 405, 414 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Security Deposits].
192. Subcommittee, supra note 2, at 110; Comment, Colorado's Wrongful Withhold-
ing of Security Deposits Act: Three Litigious Snares In an Untested Law-Colo. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §§ 58-1-26 to -28, 49 DmNVE L.J. 453 (1973).
193. Axuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1321(C) (Supp. 1973) (14 days); CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1950.5(c) (Vest Supp. 1973) (14 days); Fr". STAT. ANN. § 83.261(4) (Supp. 1973) (15
days for landlords with five or more rental units); HAwAII REV. STAT. § 521-44(c) (Supp.
1972) (14 days); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:3251 (Supp. 1973) (one month); Mo. ANN.
CoD art. 21, § 8-213(f) (Repl. Vol. 1973) (45 days); Mass. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 186,
§ 15B (Supp. 1973) (30 days); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8-21.1 (Supp. 1973) (30 days);
PA. SrAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.512(a) (Supp. 1973) (30 days).
194. California does not require written notice of amounts withheld, CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 1950.5(c) (West Supp. 1973), while Massachusetts requires only that "[any deduction
for damage pursuant to this section shall be itemized by the landlord with particularity
indicating the nature of the repair necessary to correct any damage and the actual or
estimated cost thereof." Mass. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 186, § 15B (Supp. 1973). Although
this notice usually will be written, and the draftsmen of this section probably intended
it to be in writing, the express language of the statute does not require a writing.
Similarly, Louisiana requires merely an "itemized statement accounting for the pro-
ceeds which are retained." LA. REV. STAT. A"l. § 9:3251 (Supp. 1973).
Neither Massachusetts nor New Jersey, which require written notice by either
registered or certified mail, expressly provides that this notice be communicated to the
tenant within a specified period. Although the New Jersey statute might be inter-
preted as requiring that notice be sent before the deadline for return of security de-
posits, there is no necessary inference. The possibility remains, therefore, that in these
states a landlord can refund an arbitrary amount and delay any written explanation to
the tenant until the facts and evidence have grown stale or the tenant has given up his
fight. Mass. Grar. Laws ANN. ch. 186, § 15B (Supp. 1973); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 46:8-
21.1 (Supp. 1973).
Louisiana, Florida, and Pennsylvania require that written notice be given within cer-
tain time limits and, further, cause landlords to forfeit their right to impose a claim on
deposits held if they should fail to give the mandatory notice. FLa. STAT. ANN.
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pliance is remediable only by a court judgment, the costs of which
generally exceed its utility, some states have provided for recovery
from the landlord of costs and attorney's fees in addition to the withheld
deposit. 195
All of these types of remedies are included in the URLTA.19 6 Refund
along with written notice of amounts withheld must be accomplished
within a suggested 14-day period.197 Tenants are encouraged to pursue
5 83.261(4) (Supp. 1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.512(b) (Supp. 1973); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:3251 (Supp. 1973). Maryland stipulates that notice of an intended claim
against a security deposit be given 15 days prior to the actual withholding. Failure to
give such notice precludes the landlord from withholding funds. MD. ANN. CODE art.
21, §§ 8-213(f), (h) (Repl. Vol. 1973). The Maryland statute also requires that land-
lords give new tenants a written list of all damages existing at the beginning of the
tenancy within 15 days of occupancy. Upon a landlord's failure to do so, his tenant
becomes entitled to an amount calculated at three times the security deposit less any
amount which the landlord could rightfully withhold. Id. § 8-213 (d).
Hawaii has enacted the strictest legislation covering notice requirements. Within 14
days after termination of the tenancy, landlords must notify tenants in writing of
their intent to withhold all or any part of a deposit, include "particulars of and grounds
for the retention," and include written notice of the costs of repair. Failure to comply
with this section causes a landlord to forfeit his claims. HAWAII Rav. STAT. § 521-44(c)
(Supp. 1972). The burden of this progressive legislation on most landlords is slight as,
in the course of re-renting, they will necessarily enter the premises for cleaning and
repair before the new occupant arrives. The objective safeguards that such written
notice gives tenants against subsequent landlord claims for damages caused by prior
tenants seems to outweigh any slight additional burden placed on landlords. Improved
disclosure is the goal of these sections; an honest landlord loses nothing as long as he
acts promptly within the deadline.
195. Maryland allows a recovery of three times the amount withheld plus reasonable
attorney's fees, MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, § 8-213 (f) (iv) (Repl. Vol. 1973), while New
Jersey permits recovery of two times the amount withheld "together with full costs of
any action." NJ. STAT. AN. § 46:8-21.1 (Supp. 1973). Remedies available to tenants in
Arizona and Pennsylvania are limited to tvo times the amount wrongfully withheld.
Amiz. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1321(D) (Supp. 1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.512(a)
(Supp. 1973). Louisiana allows the court, "in its discretion [to] award costs and attor-
ney's fees to the prevailing party." LA. REv. STAT. ANN. 5 9:3253 (Supp. 1973). This
section does not attempt to prejudge the reasonableness of attorney's fees as do so many
other statutes, and, by permitting an award of such fees to a prevailing landlord, it
may deter actions for recovery by some tenants. Hawaii returns only the amount
wrongfully withheld and the "cost of suit." HAWAII REv. STAT. § 521-44(h) (2) (Supp.
1972).
Two states have adopted dissimilar remedies, neither of which requires reimburse-
ment of attorney's fees. Massachusetts allows a double damage recovery plus interest
thereon at five percent. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 186, § 15B (Supp. 1973). Cali-
fornia provides only for limited punitive damage recovery plus actual damages. CAL.
Civ. CODE § 1950.5(f) (West Supp. 1973).
196. URLTA § 2.101(b), (c).
197. id. § 2.101(b). The Model Code provides for a tvo-week mandatory dead-
line for the return of funds on deposit. MODEL CODE, supra note 5, § 2-401 (2). Section
2.101(b) of the URLTA appears superior to its Model Code counterpart because the
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their legal remedies by provision that, in addition to the recoverable
security deposit and reasonable attorney's fees, a tenant may be awarded
punitive damages in the amount of twice the security deposit to be re-
funded, 19s such damages being available whether or not the landlord
withheld the deposit willfully. ta
More comprehensive protection of tenant rights to security deposits
in the post-tenancy period is provided by the URLTA than by any
other present statute. The only provision absent from the Act which
might further protect tenant interests concerning such deposits is the
criminal penalty the Model Code imposes upon a landlord who wrong-
fully and willfully retains a security deposit.200
Treatment of Security upon Transfer of the Landlord's Interest
Tenants have no protection under the common law for their security
deposits in the event a landlord transfers his reversionary interest in the
Act applies its 14-day deadline to all situations, requiring landlords to itemize all with-
held amounts in a written notice to tenants within the same time period. The Model
Code fails to require written notice itemizing amounts withheld by landlords, and it
contains a potential escape clause for unscrupulous landlords: "if at the end of this
period, the landlord is in the process of remedying tenant's defaults under See.
2-304() [Remedy for Tenant's 'Waste, Failure to Maintain, or Unlawful Use], the
landlord may retain the security deposit until he has been able to ascertain the cost of
the remedy:' MODEL CODE § 2-401(2). While the draftsmen of the Model Code un-
doubtedly intended this exception to apply only to unusual situations where the total
extent of a tenant's damages is difficult to ascertain due to the nature of the defect or
inability to obtain a professional estimate of repair within the two-week period, the
wording of this section is sufficiently ambiguous to allow a landlord to parlay the
meticulous itemizing of total damages into a lengthy retention of the tenant's funds
until the tenant abandons his claim. See note 192 supra & accompanying text. The result
apparently intended could have been obtained if, for example, the draftsmen had re-
quired the deposit of these funds in an interest-bearing escrow account which would
be disbursed to the proper party upon a final determination of actual damages.
198. URLTA § 2.101(c).
199. The Model Code provides that, upon proof of a willful retention, a landlord is
guilty of a misdemeanor. One-half of any fine imposed on the landlord is forwarded
to the tenant in addition to any damages recovered. MODEL CODE § 2-401(5), 3-501,
3-502. Hawaii allows treble damages plus costs of suit if the tenant can prove "willful-
ness." HAwAn REv. STAT. § 521-44(h)(1) (Supp. 1972). Louisiana allows tenants to
recover "actual damages or twro hundred dollars, whichever is greater, from the land-
lord or lessor" if that person willfully fails to return any amounts due within the one-
month period; a landlord's "failure to remit within thirty days after written demand
for a refund shall constitute willful failure:' LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:3252 (Supp.
1973). For a discussion of a tenant's problems in proving willful retention, see Com-
ment, Colorado's Wrongful Withholding of Security Deposits Act: Three Litigious
Snares In An Untested Law-Colo. Revt. Stat. Ann. §§ 58-1-26 to -28, 49 DENVER L.J.
453, 456 (1973).
200. MODEL CODE § 2-401(5), 3-501, 3-502.
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premises, since, absent an express lease covenant to the contrary, the
grantor-landlord is not obligated to return a deposit merely because
he terminates his status as landlord. 01 Futhermore, tenants cannot pre-
vent the transfer of their security deposits to another landlord from
whom subsequent recovery may be even more difficult than it would
be from the original landlord.202
Because the majority of jurisdictions applying the common law
treat the landlord's obligation to return a security deposit as a personal
covenant203 which does not "run with the land,"2 the grantee-landlord
takes the deposit free of any obligation to return it upon termination
of the tenancy 20  If a grantor-landlord absconds with the deposits after
transferring his interest, the tenant is left without an action against the
grantee-landlord and little chance for recovery from the departed
landlord. Tenants may encounter similar difficulty upon a transfer of
the lease from one corporate entity to another owned by the same
landlord, and uneducated or uninformed tenants may find the cor-
porate web impossible to unravel.
In contrast to the apparent complete absence of statutory remedies
prior to the drafting of the uniform acts, both the Model Code and the
URLTA protect the tenant against the loss of his security deposit due
to a change in landlords. The URLTA provision concerning security
201. Gallagher v. McMann, 119 Cal. App. 688, 7 P.2d 204 (1932); Rosenfeld v. Aaron,
248 N.Y. 437, 162 N.E. 478 (1928); Ross v. McCall, 283 S.W. 891 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
202. Eldredge v. Jensen, 89 Idaho 243, 404 P.2d 624 (1965); Perkins v. Langdon, 231
N.C. 386, 57 S.E.2d 407 (1950). See also Strum, supra note 127, at 496-97. Tenants may
object to the transfer of security deposits to a financially weak landlord since, in many
states, in the event of the landlord's insolvency tenants will have no priority over other
creditors in the deposited funds. See notes 215-18 infra & accompanying text.
203. Cummings v. Freehold Trust Co., 118 NJL. 193, 191 A. 782 (Ct. Err. & App.
1937); Daly v. Schenk, 9 N.J. Misc. 734, 155 A. 466 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
204. Partington v. Miller, 122 N.J.L. 388, 5 A.2d 468 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Cummings v.
Freehold Trust Co., 118 N.J.. 193, 191 A. 782 (Ct. Err. & App. 1937); Mallory Assoc.
v. Barving Realty Co., 300 N.Y. 297, 90 N.E.2d 468 (1949); Pollack v. Jackson, 124 Misc.
608, 209 N.Y.S. 120 (N.Y. City Ct. 1925). This personal covenant is based on privity of
contract. Kaufman v. Williams, 92 N.JL. 182, 104 A. 202 (Ct. Err. & App. 1918);
Tuteur v. P.&F. Enterprises, Inc., 21 Ohio App. 2d 122, 255 N.E.2d 284 (1970).
205. Tuteur v. P.&F. Enterprises, Inc., 21 Ohio App. 2d 122, 255 N.E.2d 284 (1970).
In certain situations the grantee does become liable to tenants for the amount of their
deposits: where the grantee becomes a substitute pledgee, Four-G Corp. v. Ruta, 25
N.J. 503, 138 A.2d 18 (1958); Kaufman v. Williams, 92 N.J.L. 182, 104 A. 202 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1918); where the grantee assumes the obligations of the grantor, Moskin v.
Goldstein, 225 Mich. 389, 196 N.W. 415 (1923); and where the grantee accepts the de-
posited funds as a set-off against the purchase price, Four-G Corp. v. Ruta, 25 N.J.
503, 138 A.2d 18 (1958); Walter H. Sullivan, Inc. v. Johnson, 116 Cal. App. 591, 3 P.2d
72 (1931).
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deposits expressly declares that "[t]he holder of the landlord's interest
in the premises at the time of the termination of the tenancy is bound
by this section." 206 Thus, the grantee-landlord stands squarely in the
shoes of the grantor-landlord if the grantee-landlord has the deposits
in his possession; in effect the obligation to return security deposits
"runs with the land."207 Moreover, the Act retains an alternative remedy
for tenants against the grantor-landlord, who "remains liable to the
tenant for all security recoverable by the tenant .... ",208 The rationale
underlying this preservation of the grantor-landlord's liability is ex-
pressed as follows: "As between the original landlord and tenant, it is
intended that the loss for failure to account for security and prepaid
rent if recoverable should fall upon the landlord who, in contrast to
the tenant, can take steps to protect the integrity of the security and
prepaid rent account at the time of sale. '20 9 The Act imposes on the
grantor-landlord the role of a surety, forcing him to pay his former
tenants an amount equivalent to the value of their deposits if the grantee-
landlord cannot refund the deposits for any reason.210
206. URLTA § 2.101 (e).
207. The courts of Michigan follow this rule. Professor Casner has observed:
"There appears to be no legal reason why the covenant cannot be treated as one
running with the land, the obligation thus devolving upon the grantee of the reversion."
1 AtmERicAN LAw oF PROPERTY § 3.73 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as
Casner].
208. URLTA § 2.105.
209. Id. § 2.105, Comment. Prior common law decisions holding that the liability
was personal to grantor-landlords, see notes 203-04 supra & accompanying text, appear
to have been concerned with the possibility that grantee-landlords might not be aware
of the existence of the deposits in question at the time of the conveyance and that some
hardship would befall them as a result. See 1 Casner, supra note 207, § 3.73.
210. A close examination of URLTA §§ 2.101(b), (e) reveals imprecise wording
which could vitiate the progressive nature of these sections. Section 2.101(e) binds
grantee-landlords to the provisions of subsection (b), which refers to required "land-
lord" actions concerning funds "held by the landlord as security." It is unclear whether
a literal reading of these subsections results in the grantee-landlord being accountable
only when the grantor-landlord actually placed these funds in his possession or also
when such funds are in the possession of any "landlord." It is submitted that a prefer-
able reading would hold the grantee-landlord responsible for any deposit paid anyone
by his new tenants. Since most security deposit requirements are included in the
leases, copies of which a purchasing landlord assuredly would obtain, the grantee-
landlord would be apprised of outstanding security deposits. Furthermore, the grantee-
landlord is in a better position to track down the absconding landlord than are indi-
vidual tenants. Trends, supra note 168, at 587. Such a construction of the Act would
place the burden of protecting the tenants' rights upon the new landlord, in consonance
with the break with the common law which this subsection accomplishes. "Landlord"
would be interpreted to mean any landlord in the chain of ownership of the reversionary
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Unlike the URLTA, the Model Code limits tenants to a recovery
of the security deposit from the present landlord only. It directs the
grantor-landlord either to turn over the security deposits to his suc-
cessor with notification to tenants of the name and address of the
new holder of the deposits or to return the funds to the tenant.211 Upon
performance of either alternative obligation, the original landlord is
relieved of any further liability respecting the deposits. The new
landlord who receives the security deposits takes with them the rights
and obligations of the original landlord.2 12 Unlike the URLTA,213
however, the Model Code provides the tenant no recourse against the
original landlord if the new landlord breaches his obligations.
State legislation in this area has been sporadic, with the existing
statutes being divided between those adopting the proposals of the
Model Code and those following the Act.21 4 It is submitted that the
Act is superior because of its provisions for dual liability of both old and
new landlords. Tenants will find either form of statute preferable to
the case law on this point.
Characterization of Security Deposit-Debt, Pledge, or Trust?
Following the execution of a lease agreement and payment of a se-
curity deposit, the landlord is assured that the deposited funds will re-
main in his hands at least for the duration of the lease term since early
termination without the landlord's consent ordinarily will result in his
permanent retention of the funds. If the business-minded landlord in-
vests the funds, the question arises whether the resulting profits may
be claimed by the landlord, who has an absolute right to the invested
funds during the lease term, or by the tenant, who has an absolute right
to return of the invested funds upon compliance with the lease pro-
visions. Another common dispute concerns priority in the security de-
posit, in the event of the landlord's insolvency, between the tenant's
interest subsequent to the beginning of a tenancy and prior to its termination. An inter-
pretation of "landlord" to mean only the landlord at the termination of the tenancy
would do violence to the progressive spirit of the Act.
211. MODEL CODE § 2-401(3).
212. Id. § 2-401(4).
213. See notes 209-10 supra & accompanying text.
214. Arizona is the only state which has expressly adopted the wording of the pro-
posed Act. Apiz. Rnv. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-1321(F), -1325(A) (Supp. 1973). Maryland has
enacted a statute which seems to effect the same result but which is susceptible to the
same questions which surround the wording of the Act. MD. AtN. CODE art. 21,
§ 8-213 (e) (Repl. Vol. 1973); see note 210 supra.
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right to a refund of the deposit and the claims of the landlord's credi-
tors. Proper resolution of both of these issues depends upon the charac-
terization of the security deposit. Absent an express agreement by the
parties, the resulting relationship between landlord and tenant may be
that of creditor-debtor, pledgor-pledgee, or trustee-beneficiary. In some
respects, the TRLTA lacks the clarity of the Model Code and existing
state legislation on this issue.
Most frequently, the landlord and tenant are said to stand as debtor
and creditor.2 1 Where the relationship is so characterized, the land-
lord, as debtor, may use the funds as he desires while they are in his
possession. He has no obligation to keep the deposited funds intact nor
to return to the tenant any profits realized from their use,' 1" despite the
fact that title to the deposited funds remains in the tenant subject to the
terms of the lease agreement.217 Because the tenant must rely solely
upon the general credit of the landlord for recovery of his deposit upon
termination of the lease, and because he has no preference over other
creditors of the landlord in the event of the landlord's insolvency,218
such a characterization of the relationship is disadvantageous to the
tenant where his landlord is heavily indebted.21 9
A pledgor-pledgee relation has been held to exist in some states 220
California and New Jersey emulate the Model Code. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1950.5(d)
(West Supp. 1973); NJ. STAT. AN. § 46:8-21 (Supp. 1973). New York follows the
Model Code in format, but instead of the "reasonable time" allowed by section 2-401(3)
of the Model Code, New York makes such action mandatory within five days after the
transfer of the reversion. N.Y. Gm. OBLIG. LAW § 7-105(1) (MeKinney Supp. 1973).
New York also allows the grantor-landlord to keep the security deposits of his former
tenants only if he notifies them by registered or certified mail of his intentions. Id.
§ 7-105(1) (c).
215. Young v. Cobbs, 83 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1955); Handle ex rel. Keswick Theatres
Corp. v. Real Estate-Land Title & Trust Co., 316 Pa. 116, 173 A. 313 (1934); 1 Casner,
supra note 207, § 3.73.
216. Rambach v. Heights Theatres, Inc., 239 App. Div. 203, 267 N.Y.S. 208 (1933);
Lefkowitz v. Parkehester Apts. Co., 61 Misc. 2d 1020, 307 N.Y.S.2d 741 (Sup. Ct. 1970);
Goodman v. Schached, 144 Misc. 905, 260 N.Y.S. 883 (County Ct. 1932); U.S. Rubber
Co. v. White Tire Co., 231 S.C. 84, 97 S.E.2d 403 (1956).
217. Burns Trading Co. v. Welbor, 81 F.2d 691 (10th Cir. 1936); City Inv. Co. v.
Pringle, 73 Cal. App. 782, 239 P. 302 (1925).
218. Malco Trading Corp. v. Mendelson-Silverman, Inc., 240 App. Div. 322, 269
N.Y.S. 95 (1934); Sadow v. Poskin Realty Corp., 63 Misc. 2d 499, 312 N.Y.S.2d 901
(Sup. Ct. 1970); Harris, A Reveille To Lessees, 15 S. CAL. L. Rav. 412, 413-16 (1942).
219. See Klramen, Landlord, Tenant and Lender Lease Security Deposit Problems,
7 LAW NorEs, 123 (1971).
220. In re Morrison-Barnhart Motors, Inc, 142 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Ohio 1956);
Rasmussen v. Helen Realty Co., 92 Ind. App. 278, 168 N.E. 717 (1929); Partington v.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
As with the debtor and creditor relationship, the pledgee-landlord has
no duty to keep deposits intact221 or to avoid commingling them with
his own funds2 22 although tide to the security deposit remains with the
tenant.223 Under the pledge relationship, however, the landlord must hold
the original deposit or equivalent substituted funds at all times during
the period of the tenancy. These funds are earmarked as the prop-
erty of the tenant, giving him priority in them over any creditors of
the landlord in bankruptcy. 25
Occasional decisions in several jurisdictions have treated security de-
posits as trusts2 6 with the landlord as trustee.227 Even within their own
jurisdictions, however, these decisions do not represent the majority
position.2 8 Trust status is more likely to be raised by stipulations be-
tween the negotiating parties or legislative action than by judicial de-
cision. A New York statute, the forerunner of recent enactments which
have created trust relationships, provides:
Whenever money shall be deposited or advanced on a contract
... for the use or rental of real property as security ... , such
money, ... until repaid or so applied, shall continue to be the
money of the person making such deposit or advance and shall
be held in trust by the person with whom such deposit or ad-
vance shall be made and shall not be mingled with the personal
moneys or become an asset of the person receiving the same . ... 220
Miller, 122 N.JI. 388, 5 A.2d 468 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Four-G Corp. v. Ruta, 45 NJ.
Super. 128, 131 A.2d 566 (App. Div. 1957).
221. Colantuoni v. Balene, 95 N.J. Eq. 748, 123 A. 541 (Ct. Err. & App. 1924).
222. Haskel v. 60 West Fifty-Third Street Corp., 138 Misc. 595, 246 N.Y.S. 698
(Mun. Ct. 1929).
223. Colantuoni v. Balene, 95 NJ. Eq. 748, 750, 123 A. 541, 542 (Ct. Err. & App.
1924).
224. Harris, supra note 218, at 421.
225. Security Deposits, supra note 191, at 416.
226. Although security deposits are treated as having a trust status in these instances,
a true trust does not actually exist. People v. Horowitz, 138 Misc. 794, 798, 247 N.Y.S.
365, 370 (Mag. Ct. 1931).
227. Atlas v. Moritz, 217 App. Div. 38, 216 N.Y.S. 490 (1926); Alumor Garage, Inc.
v. George L. Stivers, Inc., 128 Misc. 400, 218 N.Y.S. 683 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1926).
228. Boteler v. Koulouris, 1 Cal. App. 2d 566, 37 P.2d 136 (1934); Levinson v. Shapiro,
238 App. Div. 158, 263 N.Y.S. 585 (1933); Mendelson-Silverman, Inc. v. Malco Trading
Corp, 146 Misc. 215, 260 N.Y.S. 881 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 238 App. Div. 852, 262 N.Y.S. 991
(1933); Goodman v. Schached, 144 Misc. 905, 260 N.Y.S. 883 (County Ct. 1932).
229. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 7-103 (McKinney Supp. 1973). See also N.J. SrAT. ANN.
§ 46:8-19 (Supp. 1973), which expressly denominates the relationship in that state between
landlord and tenant a trust relation, and stipulates that the trust funds be placed in a
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In keeping with the trust theory, these statutes provide that funds
on deposit are exempt from the claims of creditors of the landlord,230
and conversion usually wiU lie for a landlord's failure to comply with
these statutes.231 Presumably, in a trust relationship the landlord would
have to account for any profits realized from use or misuse of the funds
in his hands.
Creation of a trust fund relationship by statute appears to be the
only effective means by which the vast majority of tenants, regardless
of wealth, will be able to obtain trust-type protection for security de-
posits. The disparity of bargaining power betveen prospective tenants
and landlords in a lessor's market is such that further statutes have been
necessary to void any agreement by a tenant to waive the trust relation
established by the legislature. 12
Unlike the URLTA, which is silent as to the rights of interested
parties in security deposits in the hands of landlords, the Model Code
attempts to create a "quasi-trust status," permitting the landlord to com-
mingle funds on deposit with his own but giving the tenant priority
over the landlord's creditors as to such funds.233 Tenants should be given
at least this much protection; the failure of the URLTA to do so sup-
ports the contention that tenant interests in this area will be best
served by developments independent of the Act.
"banking institution or savings and loan association in this State insured by an agency
of the Federal Government .... ." Maryland does not expressly label the relationship
between landlord and tenant a trust relation, but the statute requires that "[tjhe land-
lord shall maintain all security deposits in a banking or saving institution within the
State of Maryland. The account shall be devoted exclusively to security deposits .... "
ID. ANm. CODE art. 21, § 8-213(e) (i) (Repl. Vol. 1973). This creates an effective trust
relation.
Two states, Florida and Pennsylvania, expressly require the landlord to hold the
security deposits in trust (Florida) or in escrow (Pennsylvania) accounts, or, in the
alternative, to post bonds that guarantee the survival of the amount of the security de-
posits. FLA. StAT. ANx. § 83.261(2) (a) (Supp. 1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.511a
(Supp. 1973).
230. MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, § 8-213(e) (iii) (Repl. Vol. 1973); NJ. STAT. ANN.
S 46:8-23 (Supp. 1973).
231. In re Izrue Corp., 58 Misc. 2d 343, 295 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. 1968); In re Per-
fection Technical Services Press, Inc., 22 App. Div. 2d 352, 256 N.Y.S.2d 1966 (1965),
aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d 644, 273 N.Y.S.2d 71, 219 N.E.2d 424 (1966).
232. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.261(3) (Supp. 1973); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:3254 (Supp.
1974); MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, § 8-213(i) (Repl. Vol. 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8-24
(Supp. 1973); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW, § 7-103(3) (McKinney Supp. 1973); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 68, § 250.511a(f) (Supp. 1973).
233. MODEL CODE, supra note 5, § 2-401, Comment. Section 2-401 (1) of the Model
Code states that "[tihe tenant's claim to such money shall be prior to that of any
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While priority in landlord bankruptcy administration is likely to
be an important issue only for a small percentage of tenants, ownership
of the profits from reinvested security deposits is an issue affecting any
tenant deprived of the use of such funds while they are held by the
landlord. A more general objection to the common law treatment of
security deposits, therefore, might be directed against the fact that
it allows the landlord to keep the profits earned by money not his own.
Assuming that security deposits are technically only a form of prepaid
damages which remain the property of the tenant unless and until a
lease covenant is breached, the tenant has a strong argument for man-
datory payment of interest by a landlord on the funds which he holds
on deposit, or for a mandatory disbursement to the tenant of any profits
which the landlord receives from investment of such funds.
An increasing minority of states have enacted legislation providing
for payment of interest on security deposits. 23 ' Typically these
statutes apply only to deposits in excess of a specified dollar amount, 3
to those deposits held longer than a certain time period,3 6 to land-
lords renting more than a specified number of units,2 37 or to landlords
meeting a combination of these criteria.238 Interest rates239 and the
creditor of the landlord, including a trustee in bankruptcy, even if such security funds
are commingled."
234. FLa. STAT. ANN. § 83-261(2) (b) (Supp. 1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 74, §5 91-93
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973); Mo. ANN. CODE art. 21, § 8-213 (f) (Repl. Vol. 1973); MAss.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 15B (Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:8-19, -26 (Supp.
1973); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 7-103 (McKinney Supp. 1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68,
9 250.511(b) (a) (Supp. 1973).
235. MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, 1 8-213 (f) (iii) (Repl. Vol. 1973) (50 dollars or more);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.511b (Supp. 1973) (100 dollars or more).
236. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 74, 5 91 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973) (six months or more);
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 186, § 15B (Supp. 1973) (one year or more); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 68, § 250.511b(c) (Supp. 1973) (two years or more).
237. ILL. Am. STAT. ch. 74, § 91 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973) (25 or more units); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 46:8-26 (Supp. 1973) (all rental premises except owner-occupied premises
with two or fewer rental units); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 7-103 (2-a) (McKinney Supp.
1973) (six or more units).
238. The Illinois statute is the most selective. It applies only to those landlords renting
25 or more units in a municipality having a population of 500,000 or more. IU. ANN.
STAT. ch. 74, §§ 91-93 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973).
239. FLa. STAT. ANN. § 83.261(2) (b) (Supp. 1973) (five percent if deposits not kept
in trust; if kept in interest-bearing trust then tenants to receive at least 75 percent of
interest paid); ILL. AaNN. STAT. ch. 74, § 91 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973) (four percent);
Mo. ANN. CODE art. 21, § 8-213(f) (Repl. Vol. 1973) (three percent); MAss. GEN. LAws
ANN. ch. 186, § 15B (Supp. 1973) (five percent). New Jersey, New York, and Pennsyl-
vania require the funds to be deposited in accounts drawing the current rate paid for
such accounts. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8-19 (Supp. 1973); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw
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methods of payment of interest to the tenants24 ° vary among the
states.
Neither the URLTA nor the Model Code incorporates comparable
provisions. The draftsmen of the Model Code have articulated two
reasons for excluding an interest provision: 24' the belief that the work
and expense imposed upon landlords in accounting for profits would
be unjustifiable and that a tenant able to afford a security deposit large
enough to warrant the payment of interest would be able to bargain for
such interest on his own.242 Whether or not similar reasoning was applied
to the drafting of the URLTA, the failure to bring the Act abreast of
developments in tenant protection in the security deposit area may be
a source of tenant resistance to adoption of the Act.
Other Omissions from the Act
Various state statutes governing the administration of security de-
posits contain other terms favorable to tenants not found in the Act or
the Model Code. Examples include provisions for mandatory written
notice to tenants of nonrefundable cleaning or redecorating deposits,243
mandatory issuance of written receipts to tenants for security deposits
with penalties for noncompliance,24 the issuance upon request of writ-
ten enumeration of all damages to the premises caused by former tenants
present at the beginning of the current tenancy,24 5 the prohibition of
any lease requirement that tenants deliver postdated checks or nego-
tiable instruments for the payment of future rents,2 46 and the utilization
S 7-103(2) (McKinney Supp. 1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.511b (Supp. 1973).
These states allow the landlord to withhold one percent interest as an administration
fee.
240. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.261(4) (Supp. 1973) (paid to tenant when security de-
posit returned); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 74, § 92 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973) (paid to tenant
or credited against rent within 30 days after end of each 12-month period); MD. ANN.
CoDE art. 21, § 8-213(f) (Repl. Vol. 1973) (paid to tenant when security deposit re-
turned); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 186, § 15B (Supp. 1973) (paid to tenant at end of
each year); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8-19 (Supp. 1973) (credited toward rental due each
term); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 7-103(2) (McKinney Supp. 1973) (paid to tenant an-
nually or held and paid at end of term or credited toward rentals); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 68, § 250.511b (b) (Supp. 1973) (paid annually on anniversary of lease after two
years).
241. MODEL CODE, supra note 5, § 2-401, Commentary.
242. Id.
243. Amaz. REv. StAT. ANN. § 33-1321 (B) (Supp. 1973).
244. MID. ANN. CODE art. 21, §§ 8-213(c) (i), (ii) (Repl. Vol. 1973).
245. Id. § 8-213(d).
246. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 521-44(e) (Supp. 1972).
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of small claims courts by either landlords or tenants without representa-
tion by counsel. 247 These provisions are of relatively minor significance,
but the cumulative effect of their absence from the Act may create
the impression that the Act is out of step with trends in landlord-tenant
law.
Notwithstanding the various shortcomings of the Act, it is safe to as-
sert that its coverage of security deposit relations is more complete than
that of any single state. Moreover, the majority of states have undertaken
little or no statutory treatment of security deposits. Therefore, the
Act, both in its present form and as a framework for additional legisla-
tion, may be said to represent an advance in security deposit law.
Tenant Obligations and Landlord Remedies
Achieving the URLTA's goal of establishing parity in the relation-
ship between landlord and tenant requires an improvement of the legal
position of the tenant, principally through an expansion of landlord
obligations and associated tenant remedies. Improvement in the tenant's
position also may be attained, however, by a limitation of tenant obliga-
tions and landlord remedies. Article Three and Part Two of Article
Four of the Act have the latter objective.
Landlord Distraint
"Distress," "distraint," and "distress and distraint" are terms, synony-
mous in use, denoting the legal right by which a landlord may seize his
tenant's personal property as a remedy for unpaid rent.48 Although
recognized at common law2 49 and still available in many states,210 this
remedy has been under attack on several grounds.
A number of distraint statutes have been struck down for failure to
meet the procedural due process requirements of notice and opportunity
for a hearing announced in recent Supreme Court decisions.2 1 Thus,
247. Id. § 521-44(h).
248. 18 Visu. L. REv. 771 n.3 (1973). See generally Gibbons, Residential Landlord-
Tenant Law: A Survey of Modern Problems with Reference to the Proposed Model
Code, 21 HASTNGS L.J. 369, 408-11 (1970).
249. 3A G. THOMPSON, COMIMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPE_1TT
§ 1305 (repl. ed. 1959).
250. RESrATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 187 (1965).




in Georgia, 25 2 Texas, 253 and Pennsylvania, 254 statutes which failed to
provide the tenant timely opportunity to challenge the deprivation of
his personal property have been set aside. Even where a statute is con-
stitutional on its face, the possibility of abuse remains. While virtually
all state statutes provide for exemptions of certain property such as
food, clothing, or a stated dollar value,2S  the fact that the exemptions
are enforceable only by legal action may lead some landlords to ignore
them. Moreover, redress in damages for this abuse offers scant comfort
to the tenant who has been deprived of necessities for a period of time.
Accordingly, the distraint remedy has been discarded in New Jer-
sey,25 an example the URLTA has followed.2 67 Experience in New
Jersey and in the states adopting the Act 5 will test the claim that
the loss of the distraint remedy will drive landlords out of business.2 9
An exemption of 500 dollars has been proposed as a compromise, 20 but
such an exemption is more a reversion to traditional law than a true com-
promise. Elimination of the distraint remedy is obviously desirable from
the tenant point of view. Distraint being abolished by the URLTA,
tenants could achieve no greater protection by relying upon judicial
developments instead of the Act.
Self-Help Eviction
Uncertainty surrounds the present status of the common law remedy
of self-help eviction,261 especially as it is modified by forcible entry
252. Blocker v. Blackburn, 228 Ga. 285, 185 S.E.2d 56 (1971).
253. Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972) (landlord entry and distraint with-
out notice held state action without due process).
254. Gross v. Fox, 349 F. Supp. 1164 (ED. Pa. 1972) (Pennsylvania's distraint pro-
cedure held unconstitutional on its face); Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D.
Pa. 1970) (distress sales without hearing invalidated). See also Nelson v. Madigan,
I CCH Pov. L. RFa,. 2340.371 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1969) (sheriff enjoined from giving
landlord custody of tenant's property following eviction for unlawful detainer as tenant
had no opportunity to file claims of exemption allowed to other judgment debtors).
255. E.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 690 (West Supp. 1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68
§§ 250.401-.404 (Supp. 1973); S.C. CODE ANN. tit. 41 § 41-152 (1962).
256. NJ. StAT. ANN. § 2A:33-1 (Supp. 1974-75).
257. URLTA § 4.205(b).
258. See note 3 supra.
259. Note, The Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act: Reconciling Land-
lord-Tenant Law with Modern Realities, 6 IND. L. REv. 741 (1973).
260. Trends, supra note 168, at 587.
261. See generally Gibbons, supra note 248, at 404-08; Barnett, When the Landlord
Resorts to Self-Help: A Plea for Clarification of the Law in Florida, 19 U. FLA. L. REv.
238, 276-77 (1966).
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and detainer statutes.262 A growing minority of states hold that, without
a voluntary surrender of possession by the tenant, the landlord must
resort to legal process.0 3 Other jurisdictions continue to follow the
'English" rule at common law, which permits a peaceable re-entry."
Although the weight of authority would authorize a self-help eviction
where the lease permits it,263 there are recent decisions which may indi-
cate a trend to the contrary. 66
The URLTA limits the available remedies for regaining possession
and would appear to rule out self-help in removing a tenant.27 Because
the Act lacks needed procedural mechanisms, however, particularly a
procedure by which the landlord may quickly enforce his claim to
possession upon early termination of the rental agreement,""8 there
may be no viable alternative to the self-help remedy.269
Several factors encourage prohibition of self-help evictions. Such
action -on the part of the landlord may lead to a violent confrontation
with the tenant, especially in a tense urban environment, even when
262. Forcible entry and detainer statutes, enacted in numerous jurisdictions, codify
the landlord's common law right to take whatever steps are necessary to remove a
tenant from possession, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.05 (Supp. 1974-75), although limita-
tions are frequently placed on the degree of force that may be employed, e.g., CAL.
PENAL CODE § 418 (West Supp. 1970); CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. 1159-60 (West Supp.
1972).
263. Jordon v. Talbot, 55 Cal. 2d 597, 361 P.2d 20, 12 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1961) (lease
provision permitting forcible entry void as contrary to public policy); Lamey v.
Masciotra, 273 Cal. App. 2d 709, 78 Cal. Rptr. 344 (Ct. App. 1969) (forcible entry not
confined to physical force or restraint or threat of physical harm but covers incidents
of self-help without tenant's consent or resort to legal process); Malcolm v. Little, 295
A.2d 711 (Del. 1972) (summary procedure being prompt, landlord must resort to legal
process and failure to do so may entitle tenant to damages); American Holding Co. v.
Hanson, 23 Utah 2d 432, 464 P.2d 592 (1970) (summary dispossession statute held to
be exclusive remedy); Peterson v. Platt, 16 Utah 2d 330, 400 P.2d 507 (1965) (damages
for trespass and conversion awarded for landlord's taling of possession without legal
process).
264. Paddock v. Clay, 138 Mont. 541, -, 357 P.2d 1, 3 (1960).
265. Clark v. Service Auto Co., 143 Miss. 602, -, 108 So. 704, 706 (1926).
266. See, e.g., Lamey v. Masciotra, 273 Cal. App. 2d 709, 78 Cal. Rptr. 344 (Ct. App.
1969) (holding that the landlord, under a commercial lease, bad to resort to legal
process despite a lease provision allowing reentry without notice to the tenant).
267. URLTA § 4.207 provides: "A landlord may not recover or take possession of
the dwelling unit by action or otherwise, including willful diminution of services to the
tenant by interrupting or causing the interruption of heat, running water, hot water,
electricity, gas, or other essential service to the tenant, except in case of abandonment,
surrender, or as permitted in this Act."
268. See id. 5 4.206.
269. Subcommittee, supra note 2, at 106.
a peaceful eviction is attempted."' Moreover, the hardship of depriving
a residential tenant of possession before he has found other shelter
should be avoided, housing being too precious a commodity, too im-
portant to health and safety, to be denied a tenant without the safe-
guards inherent in legal process.
Elimination of the self-help remedy, a development obviously fav-
orable to tenants, has already begun in the courts. Complete elimination
will be accomplished by adoption of the Act, with the important quali-
fication that an efficient alternative procedure for eviction be available
in the adopting jurisdiction.
Eviction for Cause
Eviction is prohibited under the URLTA "except in case of aban-
donment, surrender, or as permitted in this ACt."' 7' The quoted language
would appear to prohibit arbitrary eviction of a tenant,27 2 but periodic
tenancies, week-to-week and month-to-month, may yet be terminated
at the landlord's pleasure upon the giving of appropriate notice.7 If
the tenant attempts to hold over without the landlord's consent, the
URLTA authorizes an eviction action.274 Even though the tenant may
resist eviction on the basis of the landlord's lack of good faith,7 5
problems of proof limit the effectiveness of such a defense.
Thus, the Act provides incomplete protection against an arbitrary
refusal to continue a periodic tenancy. By analogy, the principles un-
derlying the prohibition of arbitrary midterm evictions ought to apply
when renewal is denied a tenant who has every reason to anticipate
continuance of his periodic tenancy. Technically, a periodic tenancy is
a leasehold interest of very limited duration; nevertheless in practice
it is treated, by landlords and tenants alike, as a lease of indefinite term.
Therefore, any refusal to renew is, in effect, a midterm eviction-one
which, if arbitrary, ought also to be forbidden.
A minimum term, for example six months, has been proposed for all
270. Gibbons, supra note 248, at 406.
271. URLTA § 4.207 (emphasis supplied).
272. Eviction would be permissible upon a tenant's noncompliance with the rental
agreement, id. § 4.201(a), failure to pay rent, id. § 4.201(b), and abandonment of the
premises, id. 5 4.203 (c). Each of these tenant defaults is grounds for termination of the
rental agreement, whereupon the landlord has a claim for possession, id. § 4.206.
273. Id. §§ 4.301(a), (b).
274. id. S 4.301(c).
275. Id. 5 1.302.
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periodic tenancies. 276 Such a minimum term could eliminate some petty
evictions and reduce turnover in rental housing, thereby lending stability
to the housing market while leaving some flexibility by allowing the two
parties to agree to terminate or permit unilateral termination only in
special circumstances. This proposal is not contained in the URLTA
and was rejected by the authors of the Model Code? 77
Although there is no protection afforded to private sector tenants
against arbitrary eviction except through the URLTA, tenants in pub-
lic housing are protected by the doctrine that they cannot be the subject
of arbitrary eviction by a public authority. This limitation was recog-
nized in Rudder v. United States,278 the court stating that "[t]he
government as landlord is still the government. It must not act arbi-
trarily, for unlike private landlords, it is subject to the requirements
of due process of law.127 9 In Thorpe v. Hqusing Authority80 the Su-
preme Court went a step further in holding that a tenant in a federally
assisted housing project could not be evicted without notification of
the reasons for eviction and an opportunity to reply. This principle was
elaborated in Ruffin v. Housing Authority,28' the court stating: "The
right of a tenant to public housing is no less 'property' under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments than the right of a student to remain in
school. A tenant may not be deprived of it without due process of
law. 282
Eviction from public housing cannot be arbitrary or based upon mere
whim or caprice,28 and the government cannot deprive a tenant of contin-
ued tenancy without adequate procedural safeguards, even if public hous-
ing be considered a privilege.2 84 Appropriate safeguards should include
sufficient notice informing a tenant of the particular conduct alleged
276. See Gibbons, supra note 248, at 398-99.
277. Levi & Hablutzel, Preface to ABA MoDEL RESmENTIAL LAAOND~o TENANT CODE 2
(Tent. Draft 1969).
278. 226 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
279. Id. at 53.
280. 393 U.S. 268 (1969). The case concerned application of a policy circular dis-
tributed by the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Dep't of Housing and
Urban Dev., Circular, in 1 CCH Pov. L. REP. 2365.35 (Feb. 7, 1967).
281. 301 F. Supp. 251 (E.D. La. 1969).
282. Id. at 253.
283. Williams v. White Plains Housing Authority, 62 Misc. 2d 613, 309 N.Y.S.2d 454
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 35 App. Div. 2d 965, 317 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1970) (regulations prom-
ulgated by the state insufficient to protect the societal interest which the state had
established in housing).
284. Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970).
Vol. 15:84-5
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to enable him to rebut the charges. Furthermore, the tenant should have
the right to a decision based upon evidence, to which the tenant has
equal access, presented at a hearing where the tenant may challenge the
source of the evidence. Thus, a decision against a tenant is invalid when
based upon information contained in a file kept by the housing au-
thority and not made available to the tenant.-28 Finally, the tenant
should be allowed to present his case to an impartial official rather than
to the one who initiated the action against him.286 It has been urged that
a tenant have a right to counsel or an advisor.28 7 The informal procedure
litigated in Thorpe fell short of actual review, 38 prompting the sug-
gestion that housing agencies adopt administrative review procedures. 89
Another commentator has suggested that tenants in private housing
be afforded protection against arbitrary landlord action by treating
all housing as a public utility with a consequent infusion of due process
requirements into private sector landlord-tenant relations 2 90 Due process
already inheres in these relations to the extent that notice to the tenant
is a statutory prerequisite to a landlord's remedial action following an
alleged tenant default.2 '1 Due process in evictions by private landlords
285. Id. at 862.
286. Id. at 863.
287. Note, Public Landlords and Private Tenants: The Eviction of "Undesirables"
from Public Housing Projects, 77 YAI.m LJ. 988 (1968). "Nowhere has Congress or a
state legislature expressly provided that landlord-tenant law governs evictions from public
housing." Id. at 995.
288. Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev., Circular, in 1 CCH Pov. L. REP. 2365.35
(Feb. 7, 1967).
289. Note, supra note 287, at 1004.
290. Roisman, Tenants and the Law: 1970, 20 AMER. U.L. REv. 58 (1970). As a public
utility, housing would be "subject to the same regulation in the public interest as is re-
quired for those who provide light and fuel and transportation and other public neces-
sities." Id. at 61.
291. The URLTA requires notice to the tenant before the landlord may put into
effect his remedies for the following tenant defaults: noncompliance with the rental
agreement, URLTA § 4.201 (a); failure to pay rent, id. § 4.201 (b); and failure to maintain
the premises, id. § 4.202.
In Edwards v. Habib, 227 A.2d 388 (1967), rev'd, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert.
denicd, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
acknowledged three lines of cases in which the landlord's right to terminate a tenancy
is limited by due process or otherwise: (1) those involving a governmental body as
landlord, Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268 (1967); Rudder v. United States,
226 F. 2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1955); (2) emergency rent control legislation restricting the rights
of landlords, Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921); (3) eviction in retaliation for a tenant's
registering or actually voting, United States v. Beaty, 288 F.2d 653 (6th Cir. 1961);
United States v. Bruce, 353 F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1965). It might also be possible to de-
fend against eviction on the basis that the eviction was sought solely because of race.
Abstract Inv. Co. v. Hutchinson, 204 Cal. App. 2d 242, 22 Cal. Rprr. 309 (1962).
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would require, in addition, that rent modifications be "uniform in rate
to all units within the same building, for otherwise rent discrimination
could be employed as a substitute for termination."2 2
An eviction procedure ensuring due process could be burdensome
to landlords in that, not only advance notice, but also a valid reason
for terminating a tenancy should be given. Rule violations clearly ought
to constitute a substantial violation of the tenant's obligation before
termination is allowed 2 3 and perhaps should be continuous or recur-
rent in order to support a finding of undesirability 0 4 An isolated viola-
tion of law on the premises may be insufficient to show use of the
dwelling unit for an unlawful purpose and, therefore, not grounds for
eviction.0 5 It has been held that the landlord, as a private person, could
not terminate a tenancy on the ground that the tenant was in violation of
a municipal ordinance, there being no provision for private enforce-
ment of the ordinance. 296 Another court has held that a tenant under
a month-to-month oral lease could not be evicted merely because the
landlord wanted him out when the tenant had offered payment to the
landlord after receiving notice to pay rent or face termination of the
rental agreement.2 17
As noted above, the URLTA expressly prohibits arbitrary midterm
evictions, and its good faith clause limits the landlord's right to refuse
arbitrarily to renew a periodic tenancy. Although these protections are
in the nature of due process requirements, it cannot be said that the
draftsmen intended that the provisions assume constitutional dimensions;
so drastic a measure undoubtedly would provoke overwhelming op-
position from landlord interests.
292. Gibbons, supra note 248, at 398.
293. Moss v. Hirshtritt, 60 Misc. 2d 402, 303 N.Y.S.2d 447 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1969)
(mere annoyance or momentary upset not grounds for removal in summary proceeding;
provisions for forfeiture of lease disfavored and strictly construed).
294. Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc. v. Zaragoza, 2 CCH Pov. L. RE. f 15,527
(N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1972) (summary dispossession proceeding brought on claim that
tenant's mentally retarded son violated rules and regulations dismissed for failure to
show violations were continuous and recurrent).
295. 190 Stanton Inc. v. Santiago, 60 Misc. 2d 224, 302 N.Y.S.2d 693 (N.Y. City Civ.
Ct. 1969) (act must be done customarily or habitually on the premises to constitute an
illegal use for which tenant can be evicted). But cf. Manhattan Embassy Co. v. Tad
Brown, Inc., 1 CCH Pov. L. REP. 2300.38 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970) (the landlord's knowl-
edge of or acquiesence in an illegal use no bar to eviction).
296. Widano Estates, Inc. v. McCoy, 1 CCH Pov. L. REP. 2300.62 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1969) (municipal ordinance prohibiting overcrowding in dwelling units).
297. Madison v. Rosser, 3 Ill. App. 3d 851, 279 N.E.2d 375 (1972).
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Grace Periods
A tenant's failure to perform certain obligations will justify a termina-
tion by the landlord of the rental agreement, to a limited extent under
the URLTA298 and to a greater extent under most present law. The
Act 90 and statutes in 37 states,300 however, provide a grace period after
notice of default during which the tenant may correct a condition
which otherwise would result in termination,3°1 and the landlord often
is required to follow the form for notice precisely.30 2 In some cases, a
tenant's default cannot be reversed,03 but a default in rent can always
be corrected by tendering the amount in arrears plus any additional
costs imposed. Occasionally, payment of rent even after a judgment
against the tenant will be sufficient to keep the tenant in possession.304
Statutory grace periods can cause certain problems for landlords.
Frequent reliance upon a grace period by a tenant can result in a con-
tinuing lag in rent payments, arguably justifying the common landlord
practice of collecting a late charge as a penalty for late payment.30 5 A
tenant also may fail to pay rent, then, at the end of the grace period,
announce his insolvency or disappear. His occupancy of the premises
during the grace period will have been rent-free,306 the landlord's 'only
protection being the security deposit.
Nevertheless, the availability of grace periods is so widespread that
298. See note 272 supra.
299. URLTA § 4.201. A 14-day grace period following notice of noncompliance with
the rental agreement or nonpayment of rent is suggested. Id. §§ 4.201 (a), (b).
300. E.g., CAL. CODE CIV. Paoc. § 1167 (West Supp. 1973) (tenant must pay rent
within five days after it is due or surrender possession); OuE. Ray. STAT. § 105.115(1)
(1971) (same, except tenant given 10 days).
301. See Baird, The Illusory Grace Period, 7 LAw Noras 19 (1970).
302. Lamey v. Masciotra, 273 Cal. App. 2d 709, 78 Cal. Rptr. 344 (Ct. App. 1969)
(despite lease provisions allowing landlord to reenter if rent becomes more than ten days
in arrears, landlord required to give the tenant notice to pay or be evicted); Madison v.
Rosser, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 15,261 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972) (after notice to tenant to pay
within five days or suffer termination of the lease, tenant's offer of payment to the land-
lord held sufficient to bar the landlord's termination of an oral month-to-month
tenancy); American Holding Co. v. Hanson, 23 Utah 2d 432, 464 P.2d 592 (1970).
303. Baird, supra note 301, at 20.
304. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 18-55 (1952). See Saveriano v. Saracco, 97 N.J. Super. 43,
234 A.2d 244 (App. Div. 1967). In Academy Spires, Inc. v. Jones, 108 N.J. Super 395,
261 A.2d 413 (App. Div. 1970), the court stated: "Since under NJSA 2A: 18-57 a warrant
for possession may not issue until the expiration of 3 days after entry of judgment for
possession, the tenant as a practical matter has three days in which to pay the amount he
is in default in order to remain in possession." Id. at 415.
305. Subcommittee, supra note 2, at 120.
306. Gibbons, supra note 248, at 382 n.71.
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adoption of the URLTA will not work a great change. There seems
to be little basis for argument by tenants that reform outside the Act
could go beyond the grace period protections it provides. The essence
of a grace period is mandatory leniency on the part of the landlord,
and the Act affords such leniency with respect to all defaults for which
the tenant might be penalized.
Hardship Stays of Eviction
Statutes in several states allow judges to grant stays of eviction in
cases of hardship,30 7 generally for a period of six months.0 8 Each
statute requires that the tenant fully meet his obligation to pay rent
either by making payment into court or by paying the landlord direct-
ly.309 To be eligible for a stay the tenant must be exposed to severe
hardship upon eviction by reason of his inability to locate suitable hous-
ing nearby after reasonable efforts.3 10 Depending upon individual circum-
stances, a court may also impose various other conditions upon the
granting and maintaining of a stay of eviction in order to protect both
parties.
It has been argued successfully that a court's inherent power to con-
trol its own process gives it power to stay the state's eviction procedure
from going into effect until a reasonable time. Thus, in a California
case, despite statutory provisions for a five-day stay in unlawful detainer
actions,311 the court refused to set aside a ten-day stay of a default judg-
ment for rent and possession.31 2
Where authorized, a stay of execution of eviction serves as another
limitation on landlord remedies in that it can delay for periods of up
to six months the possession of the landlord's property. There is no
indication that the practice of granting stays is widespread, especially
in states not having statutory provisions for them. Nonetheless, the
307. CoNN. GEx. STAT. ANN. § 52-546 (Supp. 1973); MASs. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 239,
§§ 9-11 (Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-10.6 (Supp. 1973); N.Y. RrA, PRop.
AeTONS & Paoc. LAw § 751 (McKinney 1963).
308. An exception is New York, where the stay is limited to four months for areas
other than New York City. N.Y. REAL Paop. ACTIONS & PROC. LAW 5 751(4) (a) (Mc-
Kinney 1963).
309. E.g., N.J. STAT. AN. § 2A:42-10.6 (Supp. 1973).
310. Canigiani v. Deptula, 59 Misc. 2d 401, 299 N.Y.S.2d 234 (Dist. Ct. 1969); Joseph
v. Cheeseboro, 42 Misc. 2d 419, 248 N.Y.S.2d 969 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1964); McLaughlin
v. DeLuca, 183 Misc. 894, 50 N.Y.S.2d 454 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct. 1944).
311. CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 1174 (West Supp. 1974).
312. Tarmina v. San Jose-Milpatis Municipal Court, 1 CCH Pov. L. REP. t 2300.76
(Cal. Super. Ct. 1970).
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absence of a stay of eviction provision from the URLTA will support
tenant opposition to the Act, especially in light of the increasing diffi-
culty of locating substitute housing on short notice.
Trial Bonds
Because of the current expansion of tenant defenses to an eviction
action, the landlord may suffer loss due to the continued occupancy
of the premises by the defendant tenant during a lengthy trial. Although
the landlord may prevail on the possession issue, he may be unable to
recover the rent accruing during the litigation inasmuch as the tenant's
inability to pay may have been the cause of the attempted eviction in
the first instance.
A degree of protection can be afforded the landlord by requiring the
tenant who intends to defend in an eviction action to pay rent into
court while litigation is in progress.313 Under such a procedure the
tenant may perhaps pay more than ultimately is due the landlord, as
where the condition of the premises warrants an abatement of rent.
Moreover, there is an element of inconsistency in requiring a tenant
to pay rent into court while allowing him to assert defenses in an effort
to show that rent is not due. These issues were raised by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Bell v. Tsintolas Realty
CO. 3 14
The Bell court was concerned with balancing the equities between
landlords and tenants.31 5 On the one hand, prepayment is extraordinary
in the course of civil litigation and can restrict the right of indigent ten-
ants to proceed to trial. On the other hand, the court acknowledged the
three- to six-month delay in landlord-tenant jury trials, the availability
of new tenant defenses, and the right of the tenant to remain in posses-
sion, implying that the landlord may be in need of some form of protec-
don. Moreover, the court noted that payment of rent into court is not an
313. GA. Conn ANN. §§ 61-302 to -306 (Supp. 1973). The Georgia procedure formerly
required that a tenant, merely to defend in a summary proceeding against him, post a
bond amounting to double the potential amount due at the end of the trial and entitled
the landlord to double rent should he prevail on the merits. A tenant could prevent
immediate eviction only by filing the double bond and raising a defense to the action.
This procedure was modified while being litigated before the Supreme Court in Sanks
v. Georgia, 401 U.S. 144 (1971) (controversy held moot). See also King v. Moorehead,
495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Marini v. Ireland, 56 NJ. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
314. 430 F.2d 474 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
315. Id. at 481-84.
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additional burden imposed upon the tenant; it requires no more than
that which he promised upon execution of the rental agreement.
In balancing the competing interests, the Bell court held that only
when the tenant requests a jury trial or asserts a defense premised upon
housing code violations can the landlord require rent to be paid into
court. The landlord must demonstrate a need for the protective order,3 16
and he cannot demand back rent in an action brought for possession
only, as such a requirement would impose a penalty on the tenant.
Finally, the trial court may order payment of a lesser amount than
full rent due if the tenant can show violations of the housing code by
the landlord.
The URLTA provides that, if a tenant asserts any of his defenses
under the Act in an action for possession or rent, the court may order
him to pay into court all or part of the rent accrued or coming due.l 7
No standards are established to guide the court in the exercise of its
discretion relative to such an order. It is submitted that incorporation
of standards similar to those established in Bell would guarantee to
landlords and tenants alike the protection needed over the course of a
lengthy contest for possession or rent. The Bell solution also might be
employed to resolve an impasse between parties over repairs to be made,
the tenant paying the rent into court and the landlord using the funds
to correct the defects alleged.3 18
Additional Restrictions on Landlord Remedies
Several other restrictions are placed upon landlord remedies by the
URLTA, including prohibitions against rental agreements containing
waivers of tenant rights or remedies under the Act, confession of judg-
ment clauses, agreements by the tenant to pay the landlord's attorney's
fees, or limitations upon landlord liability arising under the law. 19 Such
provisions are made unenforceable, and their usage may result in the land-
lord paying damages to the tenant.8 20 The Act also allows courts to
refuse to enforce unconscionable provisions in rental agreements. ' 12
316. Id. at 483-84.
317. URLTA § 4.105.
318. Berman v. Sinilty, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 17,536 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1973);
Abanet Realty Corp. v. Cruz, 2 CCH Pov. L. RaP. 17,318 (N.Y. City Civ. Cr. 1973)
(summary proceeding tied up in court for two years, by consent of parties; tenant re-
fused to pay rent because of a dangerous ceiling which landlord had repaired unsatis-
factorily).
319. URLTA § 1.403(a).
320. Id. § 1.403(b).
321. Id. § 1.303(a).
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Finally, in cases of tenant abandonment under the Act, the landlord
has a duty to mitigate damages322 by making reasonable efforts to re-rent
the premises,323 thus reversing the majority rule that the landlord is un-
der no duty to mitigate.324 The prevailing rule that the landlord may
continue to hold the tenant liable for rent after abandonment 25 is
also altered by the provision that, if the landlord fails to take reason-
able steps to rent the abandoned premises, the rental agreement term-
inates as of the time the landlord was first apprised of the abandon-
ment.
320
Tenant Obligations Under the Act
In addition to the primary obligation of the tenant to pay rent,27 the
Act imposes other duties, 28 principally the obligation to maintain the
premises in accordance with building and housing codes and to keep
the premises as clean and safe as conditions permit.829 These provisions
codify the tenant's common law duty not to commit waste 30 and rep-
resent the landlord's assurance that the value of his property is not
diminished unnecessarily. If the tenant commits waste in a manner
materially affecting health or safety, the landlord may resort to his
remedies but is limited by requirements of notice and the tenant's op-
portunity to cure his breach.33' If, after notice, the tenant fails to effect
a timely cure, the landlord has the option of terminating 3 " or per-
forming the work himself and billing the tenant.33
A second tenant obligation concerns granting the landlord access
to the premises for purposes of inspection and repair.331 4 Again the
tenant's obligation is narrowed by a requirement that the landlord give
notice," 5 by a specification of only three situations in which entry may
322. Id. § 4.203(c).
323. Id. § 1.105(a).
324. E.g., Gruman v. Investors Diversified Servs., Inc., 247 Minn. 502, 78 N.W.2d 377
(1956).
325. E.g., Diehl v. Gibbs, 173 So. 2d 719 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 1965).
326. URLTA § 4.203(c).
327. Id. § 1.401.
328. Id. 5§ 3.101-.104.
329. Id. §§ 3.101(1)-(7).
330. See generally Sigsbee Holding Corp. v. Canavan, 39 Misc. 2d 465, 240 N.YS.2d
900 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1963).
331. URLTA § 4.201(a).
332. id.
333. Id. § 4.202.
334. Id. 5 3.103.
335. Id. § 3.103(c).
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be made, 36 and by a proscription of the landlord using the right of ac-
cess to harass the tenant.3  The tenant may obtain injunctive relief for
abuse of access or terminate the rental agreement and, in either case,
recover the greater of actual damages or one month's rent plus attorney's
fees. 33 8
The Act also permits the landlord to impose additional rules and
regulations upon the tenant but carefully limits them to those which
promote the convenience, safety, or welfare of the tenants, preserve
the landlord's property, or fairly distribute services and facilities made
available to the tenants.3 0 Such rules and regulations must be reason-
ably related to the purposes for which adopted, applicable to all ten-
ants equally, sufficiently explicit to inform the tenant of his obligations,
and not have the purpose of evading the landlord's obligations. If a rule
is adopted after the commencement of the lease term substantially modi-
fying the tenant's bargain, it is of no force unless the tenant consents
to it in writing.mO These provisions are said to protect the tenant from
"vague, arbitrary, whimsical, unconsented to, unpopular and unequally
enforced rules."34'
One novel URLTA provision authorizes the inclusion in leases of a
requirement that the tenant notify the landlord of any anticipated ex-
tended absence from the premises. 342 If the tenant fails to give notice
when required and the premises are damaged in his absence, he will be re-
quired to reimburse his landlord in the amount of the damages if the
landlord can show that failure to give notice was willful and the dam-
ages would not have occurred but for the tenant's absence.3 43 Thus,
the penalty for what might seem a relatively innocuous breach of the
rental agreement can be extremely harsh. Accordingly, a rental agree-
ment which contains a provision for notification of anticipated ab-
sence also should be required to include an express warning to the tenant
detailing the extent of his potential liability for failure to give such
notice.
Tenant obligations under the Act, particularly those involving the
duty not to commit waste, are drafted with great specificity. The ap-
336. Id. § 3.103(d).
337. Id. § 3.103 (c).
338. Id. § 4.302(b).
339. Id. § 3.102.
340. Id. § 3.102(b).
341. Gibbons, supra note 248, at 392 (footnote omitted).
342. URLTA § 3.104.
343. Id. § 4.203(a).
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parent intent of the draftsmen was to limit, by the principle of inclusio
unius est exclusio alterins, the obligations which may be enforced against
the tenant. Of course, the landlord may create additional obligations by
the device of rules and regulations, but midterm adoption of such rules
and regulations is ineffective against the nonconsenting tenant. Al-
though the landlord's bargaining power may enable him to impose
the rules and regulations on new tenants, such tenants are protected
further by stringent requirements for reasonableness of the rule or regu-
lation. In sum, the tenant obligations under the Act are such that
the tenant who pays his rent and refrains from destructive conduct
may enjoy the premises in the assurance that no duties may be enforced
against him other than those expressed in the rental agreement.
THE EFFECT OF THE URLTA ON DEVELOPMENT OF
ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES
Throughout the foregoing discussion of the URLTA, passing ref-
erence has been made to the relationship betveen reform in favor
of tenants under the URLTA and by means of recently developed
judicial doctrines. At this point it is appropriate to consider whether
enactment of the URLTA is likely to foreclose alternative routes of re-
form. In addition to judicial remedies, the relationship between
the URLTA and concerted tenant action for housing improvements
merits attention.
Concerted Tenant Actions
Concern for the habitability of his dwelling place occasionally has
led the tenant to join with other similarly concerned tenants in efforts
to improve their common lot.344 The decade of the 1960's3 45 saw two
significant developments in the landlord-tenant relationship: tenant
unions were organized to multiply the bargaining power of individual
tenants, and rent strikes were called by groups of tenants to protest con-
ditions and extract improvements from landlords. Despite the dubious
344. Comment, Rent Withholding and the Improvement of Substandard Housing, 53
CAn?. L. REv. 304, 323 (1965); Note, Tenant Union.: Collective Bargaining and the
Low-Income Tenant, 77 YALE LJ. 1368, 1370-73 (1968).
345. Prior to 1970, four states instituted statutory withholding of rents to be used
whenever substantial landlord noncompliance with housing regulations was discovered.
MAss. GrN. LAws ANN. ch. 239, § 8A (Supp. 1973) (enacted 1965); Micm. Comsn. LAws
S 125530(3) (Supp. 1973) (enacted 1968); N.Y. REAL Psop. ACnoNs art. 7A (McKinney
Supp. 1973) (enacted 1965); PA. STAT. A . tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Supp. 1973) (enacted
1966).
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utility of the latter tactic, both receive some support from the URLTA,
especially in the provisions concerning retaliatory conduct by the land-
lord.
Rent strikes have been defined as "the concerted withholding of
rent by a group of tenants from the same landlord, for the purpose
of exerting economic, social and political leverage to compel him to
bargain with the tenant group about maintenance, repairs, improve-
ments or other matters."' 48 These strikes, not to be confused with the
work of tenant unions,3 47 are ad hoc responses to particular problems
which have reached a crisis point. Thus, the organizations are short-
lived, seeking specific relief from an immediate problem and generally
disappearing soon after some temporary relief is granted by an in-
dividual landlord or a legislature.348
This fleeting existence of rent strike coalitions has proved to be their
major weakness. 49 A rent strike also may prove counterproductive in
provoking landlords to use one of their three primary retaliatory
weapons: failure to renew leases without cause,350 increased rental
rates,85' and abandonment -of the premises.352 Retaliation is likely to
occur during the post-strike period when strike fervor has abated and
strike leadership has dissipated. Use of a fourth traditional retaliatory
weapon, eviction for nonpayment of rent, has been limited by statute
in some jurisdictions.35 3
346. Gibbons, supra note 248, at 390.
347. See notes 360-62 infra & accompanying text.
348. Note, supra note 344, at 1370.
349. This statement assumes that a sufficient number of tenants are able to organize
in the first instance, as rent withholding by only a few of a landlord's tenants will
generate insufficient pressure to effect changes. One writer has suggested that a major
reason for the limited success of rent strikes has been the inability of each individual
tenant to demonstrate that he has suffered a constructive eviction or that his landlord
has breached an implied warranty of fitness with respect to his dwelling unit. Trends,
supra note 168, at 570. Other writers have indicated that organizing slum dwellers is
extremely difficult because of tenant apathy, fear of landlord retaliation, and the in-
ability of tenants to fund such organizations. Coulson, The Tenant Union-New In-
stitution Or Abrasive Failure?, 14 PRAc. LAw., April 1968, at 23, 25; Gibbons, supra
note 248, at 392; Note, Tenant Unions: Their Law And Operation In The State And
Nation, 23 U. FLA. L. RaV. 79, 98-99 (1970). On the other hand, middle-class tenants
have used concerted action effectively to settle a variety of claims. See Gribetz & Grad,
Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 66 COLum. L. REv. 1254, 1289
(1966).
350. Coulson, supra note 349, at 25-26.
351. Comment, supra note 344, at 320.
352. Id. at 320-22.
353. E.g., N.Y. RAL PRop. AcTos § 755 (McKinney Supp. 1973). See generally
Comment, supra note 344, at 323-31.
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Success of a rent strike depends upon the publicity it receives and
the resulting public interest. Pressure exerted by housing code enforce-
ment agencies, state legislatures, and the general public frequently has
resulted in the correction of deplorable situations.354 Nevertheless, even
when public sentiment is aroused, favorable results may not always
be achieved because of the insensitivity of some landlords to public
opinion 515 and the occasional unwillingness or inability of enforcement
agencies and legislatures to act.35 6
Despite tenant interest in statutory authorization of rent strikes, it is
submitted that the utility of the tactic is limited because it relies upon
the uncertain effects of publicity and because it may deteriorate to a
test of endurance rather than a resolution of the merits of the con-
troversy. One commentator has concluded: "[T]he tenant led rent
strike is more a symptom than a cure. It is primarily a weapon of protest
rather than an effective device for bringing a lasting solution to the
problems of slum housing. When the rent strike arises it indicates the
accepted methods of creating an adequate supply of standard low cost
housing have broken down. ' 367
Tenants need a method for pressing their demands that will not sub-
ject them to landlord reprisals and that may be readily utilized by
tenants of all income levels; at the same time, landlords must be pro-
tected against unwarranted and arbitrary tenant attacks. Although
both the URLTA358 and the Model Code359 provide for the withholding
of rent by individual tenants who believe that their landlord has failed
to comply with either the terms of the lease agreement or a specified
statute, neither statute expressly permits rent strikes.
Tenant unions promote a more reasoned approach to the settlement
of landlord-tenant disputes. A tenant union may be defined as "an
organization of tenants formed to bargain collectively with their land-
lord for an agreement defining the parties' mutual obligations."
3 60
The specific, short-term goals of rent strike coalitions differ significantly
from the expanded tenant union objectives which encompass long
354. Gibbons, supra note 248, at 390 n.118.
355. Id.
356. Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evaluation of the
Past iVith Guidelines for the Future, 38 FoRDHAM L. REv. 225, 239-42 (1969); Comment,
supra note 344, at 314-23, Note, supra note 344, at 1371.
357. Comment, supra note 344, at 334.
358. URLTA § 4.105.
359. MODEL CODE, supra note 5, §§ 2-205 to -207.
360. Note, Tenant Unions: An Experiment in Private Law-Making, 2 HARV. CirV.
Rxoirrs-Cv. Lm. L. Rnv. 237, 238 (1966).
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range planning. Moreover, rent strikes are extra-legal attempts by
tenants to coerce landlords, while tenant unions negotiate agreements
between their members and landlords which give rise to legally en-
forceable rights and duties. Tenant union tactics include continual
persuasion and negotiation, with resort to militancy only when all else
fails.361 They also provide their members with a stronger political voice
with which to exhort legislatures into enacting favorable legislation.3 6 2
No law prevents tenants from organizing tenant unions, but the func-
tioning of such a body may require legislative protection. Otherwise,
the specter of landlord retaliation might deter unions from the use of
effective measures against the landlord. In terms of vulnerability to
landlord retaliation, the member of a tenant union is in the same posi-
tion as any individual tenant, membership in the union being no pro-
tection against being singled out by the landlord. If any statutory shield
is required by tenant unions, it is the same shield needed to protect
tenants in general. The provisions of the URLTA covering retaliatory
conduct are a long step in this direction.
Retaliatory Conduct
Despite the existence of agencies charged with enforcing housing
codes, tenants usually must register a complaint in order to initiate
corrective action. Likewise, a defect on the premises not constituting
a code violation ordinarily will remain unrepaired until the tenant brings
it to the attention of the landlord. By complaining, either to an agency
or his landlord, the tenant may incur the displeasure of the landlord
and provoke some form of retaliatory action. He also may be inviting
retaliation when he joins in concerted action such as a rent strike or a
tenant union. Retaliatory measures available to the landlord include
evicting the tenant, increasing his rent, refusing to renew his lease, and
discontinuing or reducing services.
Efforts towards promoting an open and just relationship between
landlord and tenant increasingly are finding expression in legislation3"
361. Note, supra note 344, at 1370.
362. See Note, supra note 349, at 112.
363. ARiz. RiEv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1381 (Supp. 1973); CA.. Crv. CODE § 1942.5 (West
Supp. 1973); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-375a (Supp. 1973); HAwAI Rnv. STAT.
§ 666-43 (Supp. 1972); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 80, § 71 (Smith-Hurd 1966); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14, § 6001 (Supp. 1973); MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, § 8-213.1 (Supp. 1973) (appli-
cable only to one county); MNN. STAT. ANN. § 566.03 (Supp. 1974); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§5 2A:42-10.10 to .12 (Supp. 1973); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWs H9 8590, 8609 (MIcnney
Supp. 1973); R.1. GEN. LAws ANN. § §34-20-10, -11 (1969).
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and case law 304 which attempt to prevent landlords from taking unfair
advantage of their position to intimidate or punish tenants. Legal
measures adopted for this purpose are aimed primarily at aiding the
tenant who is a defendant in a landlord's retaliatory action or suit.
Thus, a landlord may be barred from recovering possession in an eviction
proceedingos or a tenant may counterclaim for damages upon a showing
of the retaliatory nature of the landlord's action. 66
The URLTA, in section 5.101, expressly prohibits three common
forms of retaliatory conduct-increased rent, decreased services, and
eviction.0 7 This prohibition is enforced by recognition of retaliatory
conduct as a defense to a landlord's action for possession,368 as a ground
for termination of the rental agreement, 69 and as a basis for the recovery
of damages and reasonable attorney's fees.370 After explicating occasions
which may call forth retaliatory conduct, including tenant complaints
364. Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp, 463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1972); McQueen
v. Druker, 438 F.2d 781 (1st Cit. 1971); Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1968); Hosey v. Club Van Cordandt, 299 F. Supp. 501
(S.D.N.Y. 1969); Schweiger v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 507, 476 P.2d 97, 90 Cal. Rptr.
729 (1970); Church v. Allen Meadows Apts., 69 Misc. 2d 254, 329 N.Y.S.2d 148 (Sup.
Ct. 1972).
365. Hosey v. Club Van Cortlandr, 299 F. Supp. 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Silberg v.
Lipscomb, 117 N.J. Super. 491, 285 A.2d 86 (1971); Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 309,
173 N V.2d 297 (1970).
366. Schweiger v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 507, 476 P.2d 97, 90 Cal. Rptr. 729
(1970); Aweeka v. Bonds, 20 Cal. App. 3d 278, 97 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1971).
367. URLTA § 5.101 (a).
368. Id. § 5.101(b).
369. Id. § 4.107.
370. Id. The tenant may "recover an amount not more than [3] months' periodic
rent or [threefold] the actual damages sustained by him, whichever is greater, and
reasonable attorney's fees." The Model Code allows an additional recovery of "the
cost of suit," MODEL CODE, supra note 5, § 2-407(3), adopted by Hawaii without sub-
stantial change, HAwAU Rxv. STAT. § 666-43 (c) (Supp. 1972).
Massachusetts provides the most liberal recovery by tenants found in a state statute
not patterned after one of the uniform acts:
Any person or agent thereof who threatens or takes reprisals against any
tenant . . . shall be liable for damages which shall not be less than one
month's rent or more than three months' rent, or the actual damages sus-
tained by the tenant, whichever is greater, and the costs of the suit, includ-
ing a reasonable attorney's fee.
ss. GEr. LAws ANNtr. ch. 186, § 18 (Supp. 1973).
Arizona, which adopted the URLTA, allows recovery of two months' rental (as
against three months' rental suggested by the URLTA) or actual damages, whichever is
greater, but has failed to provide for tenant recovery of attorney's fees. Amz. REv.
StAT. Axm. § 33-1367 (Supp. 1973). This gap in the statute may tend to discourage bona
fide tenant claims due to the high proportion of such recoveries absorbed by attorney's
fees.
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to a governmental agency or landlord and organization of or member-
ship in a tenant union, 71 the Act establishes a rebuttable presumption that
the landlord's conduct is retaliatory if there is "evidence of a complaint
within [1] year before the alleged act of retaliation .... " . This
provision is designed to remove from the tenant the virtually impossible
burden of proof in establishing that a landlord has acted with a retalia-
tory intent; the Act thus requires the landlord to prove that his actions
were not retaliatory and enumerates circumstances the existence of
which the landlord may prove to justify his actions.3 73
The one-year presumption, 3 74 in effect, gives tenants a one-year grace
period following a complaint. Although the provision arguably may
encourage tenants to register complaints periodically in order to pre-
serve the benefits of the presumption, '7 5 any spurious complaints would
run afoul of the Act's good faith requirement 37 6 requiring "honesty
in fact in the conduct of the transaction concerned." 77 Nevertheless,
because of the difficulty of proving lack of good faith, a better, more
objective test of the good faith of a complaint should incorporate some-
thing akin to the "reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in
the trade" test of the Uniform Commercial Code.373 Thus, a mere show-
ing of a complaint ought not suffice to raise the blanket presumption;
some evidence should be offered tending to prove that the condition
complained of could reasonably be thought to have resulted from a
breach of the landlord's duties.
In its present form the presumptive retaliation provision hardly
offers grounds for tenant opposition to the Act inasmuch as its weak-
ness works against the landlord. Even with the addition of the proposed
requirement for proof of the complainant's good faith, the protection
371. URLTA §§ 5.101 (a)(1)-(3.
372. Id. § 5.101(b).
373. Id. § 5.101(c). The section provides that the landlord's action for possession is
justified if a code violation in question was caused by the tenant, if compliance with a
code would require such extensive work as to deprive the tenant of the enjoyment of his
premises, or if the tenant is in default in rent. Id.
374. Other statutes provide for shorter periods: Axuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1381(B)
(Supp. 1973) (six months-adopting the Act but substituting a shorter period than the
suggested one year); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-375a(a) (Supp. 1973) (six months);
HAWAII REv. STAT. § 666-43(a) (Supp. 1972) (six months); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§ 6001 (Supp. 1973) (six months); MASS. GEN. LAwrs ANN. ch. 186, § 18 (Supp. 1973)
(six months); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 566.03 (Subdiv. 2) (Supp. 1973) (90 days).
375. Strum, supra note 127, at 503.
376. URLTA § 1.302.
377. Id. § 1.301(4).
378. UnFORM COMMERCAL CODE § 2-103(1) (b).
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given tenants against retaliatory conduct of the landlord by the URLTA
would permit pursuit of improvement of specific grievances by in-
dividual or concerted actions. Furthermore, the Act evidences an in-
tent to encourage, rather than foreclose, general reform of landlord-
tenant law by the courts and the legislatures.
The URLTA and Case Law Development of Habitability Doctrines
Two specific provisions in the Act suggest that the draftsmen did
not intend to curtail independent judicial development of rules gov-
erning the landlord's obligation to supply habitable premises. The
comment to the general tenant remedies section states: "Remedies avail-
able to the tenant pursuant to Section 4.101 are not exclusive.- 79 Ad-
ditionally, the Act provides that, unless specifically displaced by the
Act, common law principles remain applicable to the landlord-tenant
relationship.3s0 These provisions evidence the intent of the URLTA
not to preempt the field of reform but to leave the courts free to fashion
the law needed to fill the gaps left by the Act. Nevertheless, these two
provisions do not dispose entirely of the potentially inhibitory effect of
the Act, and, in any event, construction of a statute is not always bound
by the draftsmen's intent.3"' It remains possible that, notwithstanding
these provisions, a court faced with a situation not covered by the Act
will feel itself precluded by the very existence of such a wide-ranging
statute from judicial lawmaking and will fall back upon old law. Con-
sideration -of the habitability concept illustrates the relationship between
the DRLTA and judicial reforms bolstering the position of the tenant.
Comparing the theories of implied warranty of habitability developed
in the courts with the obligations imposed by the URLTA in section
2.104 reveals similarity. Commonly included in the judicial doctrine is
a covenant that the premises are fit for habitation at the start of the
term as well as a covenant that the landlord will maintain the premises
379. URLTA § 4.101, Comment.
380. Id. § 1.103. This provision, which, like several other general provisions of the
Act, is adapted from the Uniform Commercial Code, provides: "Unless displaced by
the provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity, including the law relating
to capacity to contract, mutuality of obligations, principal and agent, real property,
public health, safety and fire prevention, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress,
coercion, mistake, banlkuptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause supplement its
provisions."
381. Cf. West Side Bank v. Marine Nael Exch. Bank, 37 Wis. 2d 661, 155 N.W.2d
587 (1968); Malcolm, Reflections on West Side Bank: A Draftsman's View, 18 CATHOLiC
UJL. REv. 23, 30-33 (1968).
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in habitable condition throughout the term. Frequently, there is an
added warranty relating to violations of applicable housing codes.3&
Section 2.104 follows the judicial warranty of habitability doctrine:383
both incorporate applicable housing code provisions into the war-
ranty;3' each requires the landlord to provide and maintain the premises
in a habitable and safe condition;383 and each assures provision of services
essential to the tenant's enjoyment of the premises. 8 Section 2.104
differs substantially from the judicial doctrine only in its greater detail
and specificity.
Among the remedies provided by the URLTA for breach of the
habitability warranty are rescission,387 damages and injunctive relief,3M
self-help,389 and rent withholding.390 Courts have invoked the implied
warranty doctrine to allow each with the possible exception of in-
junctive relief.8 91 Dicta in one opinion indicated that a tenant could
382. In Mease v. Fo, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972), the Iowa Supreme Court stated
what has become the most frequently articulated version of the implied warranty of
habitability:
[Tihe landlord impliedly warrants at the outset of the lease that there are
no latent defects in facilities and utilities vital to the use of the premises for
residential purposes and that these essential features shall remain during the
entire term in such condition to maintain the habitability of the dwelling.
Further, the implied warranty we perceive in the lease situation is a repre-
sentation there neither is nor shall be during the term a violation of appli-
cable housing law, ordinance or regulations which shall render the premises
unsafe, or unsanitary and unfit for living therein.
Id. at 796.
383. URLTA § 2.104, Comment.
384. Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 796 (Iowa 1972); URLTA § 2.104(a) (1).
385. Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 796 (Iowa 1972); URLTA §§ 2.104(a) (2), (3).
386. Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 796 (Iowa 1972); URLTA §§ 2.104(a) (4)-(6).
387. URLTA § 4.101(a).
388. Id. § 4.101(b).
389. Id. §§ 4.103, 4.104.
390. Id. § 4.105.
391. Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Reste Realty Corp. v.
Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.WV.2d
409 (1961) (all providing for rescission). Damages are usually in the form of partial or
total abatement of rent due to the defective condition of the demised premises. Quesen-
bury v. Patrick, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP,. 15,803 (El Paso County Ct., Colo., 1972); Mease
v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293
N.E.2d 831 (Mass. 1973); Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 111 N.J. Super. 477, 268 A.2d
556 (Dist. Ct. 1970). Self-help was permitted in Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d
526 (1970). Cases permitting rent withholding include Givens v. Gray, 2 CCH Pov.
L. REP. 15,412 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. Ct. App.
1972); Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 111 N.J. Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556 (Dist. Ct.
1970).
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be granted specific performance in a proper case,aa and the self-help




Whether the URLTA is intended to supplant the illegal contract
theory developed in the courts is unclear. Seemingly, the provision
which allows termination of the lease upon a failure of the landlord to
comply with applicable housing codes 9 4 incorporates the illegal con-
tract theory into the Act. While a housing code violation would not
render the lease void per se under the URLTA, it would allow the
tenant to terminate the lease, with the same result. The well-recognized
weaknesses of the illegal contract theory, especially when the tenant
desires to remain in possession, 0 5 should indicate the scant likelihood
that the theory would be expanded by the courts; thus the Act poses
no threat to tenant gains otherwise achievable by application of the
theory.
Review of tenants' rights and remedies vis-a-vis habitability thus indi-
cates that the URLTA goes at least as far as any judicial doctrine in a di-
rection favorable to tenants. It does not appear that any argument on be-
half of the tenant has found acceptance in the case law which does not
have its counterpart in the provisions of the Act. It may be concluded
that, with respect to habitability, the Act embodies the most progressive
leg-al thinking from a tenant's standpoint, leaving no grounds for the
S92. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp, 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 n.61 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
393. The statement in Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 n.61 (D.C.
Cir. 1970), regarding the availability of specific performance and the provisions of the
URLTA allowing injunctive relief, URLTA § 4.101(b), raise difficult questions con-
cerning the practicability and desirability of using a residential lease as a basis for com-
pelling a landlord to make improvements on his property at the insistence of his tenant.
See notes 34 & 39 supra.
Besides the injunctive relief provided in section 4.101(b), the comment to section
1.105 indicates that specific performance may be available under supplementary principles
of law and equity through section 1.103. Section 1.102 states that one purpose of the
Act is "to encourage landlords and tenants to maintain and improve the quality of hous-
ing .... 1" URLTA § 1.102(b) (2). There may be a question, however, whether compul-
sion by specific performance is a proper form of "encouragement" under the terms of
the Act.
394. URLTA § 4.101 (a). The tenant may terminate for noncompliance with section
2.104(a) (1), which requires the landlord to conform the premises to building and housing
codes.
395. Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1972). Several courts
have declined to apply this theory for various reasons. E.g., Golden v. Gray, 2 CCH
Pov. L. Rr P. i 15,295 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971); Posnanski v. Hood, 46 A¥is. 2d 172, 174
N.V.2d 528 (1970).
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contention that the Act retreats from the judicial development of
tenants' rights. Furthermore, an examination of the course of judicial
handling of landlord-tenant law in the leading jurisdictions of Wisconsin
and New Jersey demonstrates the uncertainties inherent in reliance
upon case law development of reforms favorable to the tenant.
Problems of Judicial Reform of Landlord-Tenant Law
As discussed previously,396 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, which
propounded the original statement of the implied warranty doctrine in
Pines v. Ferssion,3 97 nevertheless later decided against a tenant who ar-
gued an illegal contract theory on facts that apparently would have
supported a decision in favor of the tenant on the implied warranty
theory.3 98 Several possibilities may account for the differing results:
the tenant may not have raised the arguments suggested by Pines; the
court may have failed to recognize the import of its own precedent in
Pines; or the court may have determined sub silentio that Pines should
be limited strictly to its facts. The legislative policy invoked in support
of the earlier broad statement of the implied warranty doctrine was
viewed in the later decision as a hindrance to further expansion of the
doctrine. Certainly there were distinguishng features in the cases, but
there are distinctions in all cases. The two cases demonstrate that the
shortcoming of a judicial precedent, as contrasted with a statutory rule,
is its limited ability to embrace a broad spectrum of factual variations or,
stated conversely, its susceptibility to being distinguished away factually.
Further complications in Wisconsin arise from a later decision by
a lower court, Posnanski v. Department of Agriculture,399 upholding
a state administrative agency's cease and desist order prohibiting the
leasing of dwellings which had been placarded as unfit for human
habitation or against which housing code violations had been cited,
unless the prospective tenants were fully informed of the defects in
question. The theory of the order concerned unfair competition by
misrepresentation based on nondisclosure, but, significantly, the basis for
allowing the action was the judicially created doctrine of implied war-
ranty. Thus, the case exemplifies inconsistency in application of a ju-
dical doctrine, even within the jurisdiction which conceived it.
New Jersey decisions on implied warranty reveal a more orderly
396. See notes 44-57 supra & accompanying text.
397. 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
398. Posnanski v. Hood, 46 Wis. 2d 172, 174 N.W.2d 528 (1970).
399. 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 17,054 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1973).
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evolution of the doctrine, as straightforward and consistent as that of
any jurisdiction. Nonetheless, a careful reading of the opinions in that
state reveals that the development of the law has not been free of
difficulty.400
In the first New Jersey case to enunciate the implied warranty theory,
Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper,40- the court found for the tenant on a
claim of constructive eviction, but, apparently because of the length
of time the tenant had remained on the premises before abandonment,4 2
the court buttressed its decision by citing Pines and discussing the doc-
trine of implied warranty "against latent defects. '40 3
Given the facts before the court in Reste, a decision could have rested
on either the implied warranty or constructive eviction theories; the
court, however, tied the two together. Consequently, in the next case
concerning habitability, Marini v. Ireland,404 upholding a tenant's right
to deduct from rent the cost of self-help repairs, unnecessary reference
was made to the doctrine of constructive eviction. After discussing
the rule of implied warranty, the opinion equated a breach of the war-
ranty with a constructive eviction.405 Noting the inappropriateness of
the constructive eviction requirement that the tenant abandon the
premises, the court asserted that the tenant should have a right to cor-
rect the cause of such constructive eviction. Carrying further its in-
corporation of constructive eviction principles into the implied war-
ranty, the court stated that "the tenant has only the alternative reme-
400. An interesting point, not as evident from the New Jersey decisions as from a
comparison of cases in other jurisdictions, is that the earlier decisions, e.g., Pines v.
Perssion, 14 'Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961), were very short and concise, with
little discussion of the possible ramifications of the holding. By comparison, the more
recent decisions, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 111. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Boston Housing Au-
thority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831 (Mass. 1973), have been quite voluminous, often
dwelling at length upon explanations of those doctrines which are being rejected and
accepted, as well as the policy considerations underlying the courts' actions. In addi-
tion, the presence of concurring (Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, supra)
and dissenting (Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, supra) opinions is an indication of the more
thorough analysis that the implied warranty doctrine is receiving in recent decisions-
A greater judicial appreciation of the multi-faceted consequences of the implied war-
ranty doctrine is apparent.
401. 53 NJ. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969).
402. Strict application of the constructive eviction theory requires that the tenant
abandon the premises soon after the alleged defect is discovered. See notes 16-20 supra,
& accompanying text.
403. 53 N.J. at -, 251 A.2d at 276.
404. 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
405. Id. at -, 265 A.2d at 534.
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dies of making the repairs or removing from the premises upon such a
constructive eviction."40 6
In Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 40 7 a lower court sought to apply
the ill-defined New Jersey rule where a tenant had withheld rent be-
cause of numerous defects in his apartment, claiming a partial or total
abatement of rent due to the alleged reduced value of the premises.
The court observed that "whether Marini is authority for the tenant's
position is.. . troublesome, '408 since the tenant had neither repaired the
defects nor vacated the premises and was therefore not within the
letter of the Marini rule.409 Nevertheless, the court placed the case with-
in the "broad principles" enunciated in Marini and Reste, finding it
difficult to believe that the Supreme Court intended in Marini for the
tenant's only available remedy, besides abandonment, to be self-help,
especially in the case of a 400-unit apartment complex.41 0
Not until three years later did the New Jersey Supreme Court af-
firm the lower court's interpretation of the Marini principle. In Berzito
v. Gambino41' a tenant again sought an abatement of rent because of
uncorrected defects in his apartment. Referring to the language in Marini
restricting tenants' remedies, the court stated that it would not let a
"casual dictum ... shackle the Court to prevent a later exercise of its
creative powers in fashioning new remedies as need and occasion de-
mand." 4'2 Berzita clearly broadened the remedies available to redress
breach of the landlord warranties; it must be noted, however, that the
warranty litigated in that case was express.41 3 Therefore, Berzito tech-
nically is not authority for giving relief for breach of an implied war-
ranty to a tenant who has neither repaired the defects nor vacated the
premises.
In Berzito the court's opinion was directed to the questions of de-
pendency of lease covenants and expansion of tenant remedies and did
not address the constructive eviction aspects of the earlier decisions.
Thus, the implied warranty of habitability and the doctrine of construc-
tive eviction have not yet been disentangled in New Jersey, With the
406. id. at -, 265 A.2d at 535 (dictum) (emphasis supplied).
407. 111 NJ. Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556 (Dist. Ct. 1970).
408. Id. at -, 268 A.2d at 558.
409. The court took judicial notice of a housing shortage in the locality which would
make an abandonment requirement unreasonable. Id. at -, 268 A.2d at 558.
410. Id. at -, 268 A.2d at 559-60.
411. 63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973).
412. Id. at -, 308 A.2d at 21.
413. Id. at -, 308 A.2d at 20-21.
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result that, theoretically, a tenant could be denied relief in an implied
warranty situation.
Another factor affecting the development of law in the courts is a
judicial reluctance to embark upon a new course, especially in areas
in which the legislature has acted. Landlord-tenant cases have often
expressed a concern with this problem because of the widespread use
of building and housing codes and the piecemeal enactment of landlord-
tenant legislation. Accordingly, the potential effect of legislation such
as the URLTA upon judicial attitudes is central to the present inquiry.414
A comparison of judicial attitudes in Wisconsin and New Jersey
illustrates alternative approaches to the question of "judicial legislation."
414. In addition to the possibility that adoption of the Act might stultify judicial de-
velopment in jurisdictions enacting it, it has been suggested that courts in other juris-
dictions might also refer to the URLTA standards and remedies in fashioning their own
doctrines. It is argued that the Act could prevent the development of additional reforms
in all jurisdictions, especially if the Act were endorsed by the American Bar Association.
Subcommittee, supra note 2, at 123. If, however, the standards and remedies provided by
the Act are superior to those which have been developed in the courts, the influence of
a uniform act would not necessarily be detrimental to the interests of tenants and might
be advantageous, in that the greater specificity and definiteness of the Act might find its
way into the case law.
There is also a question whether uniformity in the law governing the landlord-tenant
relationship is necessary among the various jurisdictions in the United States. If there
is such a need, then courts should look to other states' legislative enactments, such as the
URLTA, and judicial decisions construing this legislation in order to promote the
accomplishment of one of the Act's purposes, "to make uniform the law with respect to
the subject of this Act among those states which enact it." URLTA § 1.102(b) (3). Any
argument that uniformity is necessary in landlord-tenant law is far less persuasive than
in areas such as sales and negotiable instruments encompassing aspects of commerce in
which frequent transactions spanning two or more jurisdictions render the need for
uniformity readily apparent. Such considerations traditionally have been absent from
landlord-tenant law, although the growth of the national economy and, especially, the
development of various forms of joint and syndicated property ownership undoubtedly
have resulted in a greater number of property owners who reside outside the state in
which their property is situated.
The difference between the urban and rural landlord-tenant relationship may be an-
other reason why uniformity is not necessary and why it may, indeed, be inadvisable.
The rationale underlying the older common law rules may still have application in some
of the rural areas of the country. If so, the courts have been as guilty as the draftsmen
of the URLTA in failing to make this distinction. Generally the court-made rules have
not limited their applicability to urban situations, although invariably the cases have
arisen from urban residential leases. The URLTA has to some extent taken this distinc-
tion into account by allowing certain exceptions to the applicability of the Act. URLTA
§ 1.202. The most noteworthy of these exceptions is found in section 1.202(7), which
provides that premises used primarily for agricultural purposes are excluded from the
coverage of the Act.
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In Posnanski v. Hood' 5 the Wisconsin Supreme Court was asked to
grant a tenant the power to withhold rent in order to force landlord com-
pliance with local housing regulations. Although in Pines4 ", the court
previously had fashioned a remedy which comported with its view
of the general legislative housing policy, in Hood it seemed to find such
a policy inadequate to support a holding in favor of the tenant. Upon
noting that statutorily approved rent withholding had been involved
in decisions in other jurisdictions approving use of the tactic for hous-
ing code enforcement, the court ruled that rent withholding was im-
proper absent specific legislative authorization.1T
The approach of the New Jersey court in Berzito v. Gambi 418 con-
trasts with the strict position taken by the Wisconsin court. Although a
statute authorizing rent withholding in New Jersey enacted subsequently
to the dispute litigated in Berzito was nonretroactive, the court felt
free to rely upon it, observing that "a statute often reflects legislative
concern over a longstanding abuse, and to that extent may be fairly
understood as articulating a public policy pre-existing the date of the
statutory enactment. Such is clearly the case here."41 9 A more conserva-
tive court might have argued that enactment of a rent withholding
statute indicates a legislative determination that the matter is one for
statutory regulation and that, prior to the legislative entrance into the
field, the withholding of rent was unauthorized.
An even broader reading of a legislative mandate is found in Boston
Housing Authority v. Hemingway,420 concerning statutory rent With-
holding in Massachusetts. The court found that the tenant could not
rely upon the rent withholding statute because he had failed to give the
landlord the required form of notice.421 Nonetheless, the tenant was
afforded relief under the implied warranty and dependent covenant
theories, approved for the first time in Massachusetts in this case. The
court discussed several state statutes which had established statewide
housing standards, sanctioned rent withholding, and allowed a tenant
to initiate housing code enforcement process by paying rent into court
415. 46 Wis. 2d 172, 174 N.W.2d 528 (1970).
416. Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, -, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412-13 (1961).
417. 46 Wis. 2d at -, 174 N.W.2d at 533.
418. 63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973).
419. Id. at -, 308 A.2d at 23.
420. 293 NE.2d 831 (Mass. 1973).
421. The landlord had been notified of housing code violations by public authorities
before the tenant started to withhold rent. An amendment to the Massachusetts statute




for use to correct the alleged defects.422 Instead of determining that
the legislature thus had preempted landlord-tenant law reform, the
court decided that the judicial erosion of the older rules was accelerated
by such legislation. The court also found itself "confronted with a situa-
tion in which the legislation's 'establishment of policy carries sig-
nificance beyond the particular scope of each of the statutes in-
volved' "43 and concluded: "If we fail to repudiate the underlying
common law concept of a lease which fostered the independent cov-
enants rule, the landlord-tenant law in Massachusettts will remain in an
illogical state because our statutory and common law will be based on
different conceptual assumptions as to the essential nature and conse-
quences of a lease."' 4
The reluctance of the Wisconsin court to enter without invitation
upon territory occupied by the legislature has been shared by other
jurisdictions.4 25 Most of the decisions reflecting this attitude, however,
are either relatively old or were rendered by lower courts understand-
ably hesitant to make new law; more courts have exhibited the will-
ingness to supplement statutory law typified by Berzito and Boston
Housing Authority.4 26 Indeed, a reverse effect has been observed, name-
ly, statutory reform prompted by judicial activism.427 In any event, it
422. Id. at 838-39.
423. Id. at 840.
424. Id. at 843.
425. Golden v. Gray, 2 CCH Pov. L. R.P. 15,295 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971); of. Murdock
v. Lofton, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 17,280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973); Fritz v. Warthen, 2 CCH
Pov. L. REP. 16,001 (St. Paul Mun. Ct, Minn. 1972); Kearse v. Spaulding, 406 Pa. 140,
176 A.2d 450 (1962); Northchester Corp. v. Soto, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 17,011 (Bucks
County Ct. C.P., Pa. 1972). See also Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 IMi. 2d 351, 378, 280
N.E.2d 208, 223 (1972) (dissenting opinion); Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway,
293 NE.2d 831, 851-53 (Mass. 1973) (concurring opinion).
426. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Jack
Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 366-67, 280 NE.2d 208, 217 (1972); Mease v. Fox,
200 N.V.2d 791, 796 (Iowa 1972); Rome v. Walker, 38 Mich. App. 458, -, 196
NAV.2d 850, 853 (1972); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 73 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973);
Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, -, 276 A.2d 248, 251 (1971); Morbeth Realty Corp. v.
Velez, 73 Misc. 2d 996, -, 343 N.Y.S.2d 406, - (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1973);
Ellabee Realty Corp. v. Beach, 72 Misc. 2d 658, - , 340 N.Y.S.2d 8, - , (N.Y.
City Civ. Cc. 1972). The two New York cases exemplify application of a statutory
tenant remedy, N.Y. R&AL Pao'. AcnoNs § 755 (MeKinney Supp. 1973), permitting a
tenant to obtain a stay of proceedings in a landlord suit for possession or rent in the
event certain defects or housing code violations are shown to exist. The statute was
interpreted in light of the doctrine of implied warranty of habitability, so as not to
frustrate the legislative purpose of inducing landlords to maintain their property.
427. In reference to the District of Columbia's enactment of tenant remedy provisions,
it has been noted: "Drawing upon this rapidly developing case law, the city council's
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seems clear that legislation such as the URLTA will more likely be
perceived by the courts as encouraging, rather than foreclosing, further
expansion of landlord-tenant law. Enactment of the URLTA should
be viewed as an expression of a legislative intent that the ancient
legal rules, so favorable to the landlord, be discarded as unreasonable and
impracticable in a modem, urbanized society."2
CONCLUSION
Since compromises are inevitable in drafting uniform acts, the Uni-
form Residential Landlord-Tenant Act is subject to the criticisms of
those who reject compromise. Landlords will find much of the Act
objectionable; indeed, it is probable that landlords will resist its adop-
tion by individual states more vigorously than will tenants. Neverthe-
less, this Note is confined primarily to an examination of the effect
adoption of the Act will have upon the legal position of tenants. As a
general proposition, it may be stated that the Act is much more than
a codification of existing law, although its effect will vary from state
to state. It accomplishes reforms in landlord-tenant law which will
be of significant benefit to tenants.
Two doctrines borrowed from the case law form the core of the
Act. First, the theory of implied warranty of habitability is adopted,
imposing upon the landlord an obligation to put and maintain the
tenant's premises in habitable condition. Second, lease covenants are
made dependent so that maintenance of the premises in a habitable
condition by the landlord is a condition precedent to his recovery for
any tenant breach of the lease agreement.
Although similar developments are progressing in the courts that
arguably may afford the tenant greater protection than the URLTA
compromised provisions, there is no certainty that judicial activism Will
ever extend so far. In any event, it must be conceded that expansion of
tenant rights in the courts has been halting and sporadic. Indeed, the
recent Supreme Court decision in Lindsey v. Normet" that there is no
constitutional requirement that lease covenants be treated as dependent
Landlord-Tenant Regulations codify and strengthen the common law rather than estab-
lishing remedies unrelated to these judicial developments. Because of the judicial
activism, broader opportunities for reform were available to the council than would
have been available to a similar body in a jurisdiction rigidly governed by traditional
common law concepts." Daniels, supra note 39, at 956.
428. URLTA § 1.102; § 1.102, Comment; § 2.104(e), Comment; § 4.101(d), Comment;
4.105, Comment.
429. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
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may presage a retrogressive trend of decisions. Moreover, no con-
sistent pattern of independent state legislation exists that could be said
to obviate the need for the Act. Finally, the assertion that adoption of
the Act will foreclose judicial developments beyond the Act is of
dubious validity at best; at worst, it is a charge that the judiciary will
abdicate its proper function.
Tenants may view the omission of some provisions as shortcomings
of the Act. Notably absent are the English rule governing the tenant's
right to possession at the inception of the tenancy and a provision for
fiduciary-type protection of the tenant's security deposit while in the
hands of the landlord. The lack of procedural improvements by which
tenants may implement their expanded remedies is also problematic, al-
though it is understandable that the draftsmen would not attempt to
superimpose a single procedure for landlord-tenant actions upon the
disparate procedural systems of the various jurisdictions. 30 On balance,
nevertheless, it is submitted that the positive features of the Act heavily
outweigh it shortcomings, with the result that tenants in all jurisdictions
will profit by its speedy adoption.
430. See Subcommittee, supra note 2, at 106, stating: "[T]he absence of even an
attempt to suggest such a procedural method may lead some to claim that perhaps this
inability to insure speedy enforcement of the rights may be sufficient to make the draft-
ing of this particular Act inappropriate at this time."
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